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ABSTRACT
Nortel Networks, a leading global supplier of telecommunications equipment, is engaged
in an increasingly competitive global market place. Within this market, Nortel Networks is
positioning itself as the leader of global network transformation. The vision of the new
transformed network is one in which disparate network elements are converged onto single
architectural platforms serving the Client, Wireless Access, Network Services, Multi-services
Packet, VoIP, Multi-services Optical and Element Management aspects of the newly transformed
network architecture.
This paper focuses specifically on the hardware development process associated with the
CDMA wireless access element referred to as a base transceiver station (BTS) in the transformed
network. The effect of part commonality on product development lead times are investigated at
four levels of integration: common part (ASIC), common assembly (circuit pack), common field
replaceable unit (module) and finally the common platform (BTS).
At increasing levels of integration, the use of common parts leads to longer product
development lead times. This observation is examined using two methodologies.
The first methodology utilizes the three lenses framework focusing primarily on the
impacts of organizational structure on the product development process. An evaluation of the
existing barriers preventing joint gains and acceptable compromises to be achieved amongst
share holders in joint development programs is discussed. Methods by which to minimize the
impact of organizational structure on common product development lead time are given and
comparisons are made with alternate organizational models from within the telecommunications
industry.
The second methodology employed utilizes task based design structure matrices (DSM)
to analyze the implication of part commonality on product development lead times for projects
structured in accordance with the Nortel Networks Life Cycle Management model. Effects
modeled include stochastic durations, probabilistic iterations, learning effects, resource
constraints, parallel tasks and overlapping tasks. An evaluation of the results indicates an
increased sensitivity to extended product development lead times associated with probabilistic
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iterations. This is shown to be particularly evident during the requirements definition phase in
which multiple stakeholder requirements must be captured comprehensively. This sensitivity is
amplified by the fact that product verification takes place in multiple labs each exercising the
equipment in unique and un-accounted for configurations.
Based on the above analysis, a framework to ascertain the optimum level of commonality
to pursue on a given product is given.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Insight from a Brief History of Product Development
The sole purpose of new product development is to satisfy an existing market or customer
need. According to Philip Kottler, it is possible to "distinguish among five types of needs: stated
needs, real needs, unstated needs, delight needs and secret needs"1 . Each need types may drive a
unique product development strategy or approach but in every case minimizing the product
development cycle time is of benefit to the developer. Product development cycle time is
therefore a competitive measure not in absolute terms but in relative terms when measured with
respect to the product development cycle times of the other competing parties. Metaphorically
this can be thought of as the squirrel wheel of progress.
The need for and pursuit of shorter and more predictable product development lead times
is well documented in literature. Although typically thought of as a modem problem, product
developers have for centuries struggled against fierce competition in bringing a new product to
market. Some brief examples are given below.
The Longitude Act passed by the British Parliament on July 8, 1714 was in essence the
translation of a real need into a stated need. A prize of E20,000 was given to the first individual
who could solve the dilemma of estimating longitude to within half a degree whilst at sea. The
need was great as was the prize; the competition was open to any person of any nationality using
any method. The real need could not be overstated. In a single incident on October 22, 1707,
1Kottler, Philip, 2003,"A Framework for Marketing Management", 2 "d Ed., Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey, ISBN 0-13-100117-5
11 of 143
two thousand sailors lost their lives and four British warships were sunk as they ran a ground off
of the shores of the Scilly Isles significantly off course. In 1727, John Harrison began in earnest
to develop a precision chronometer capable of winning the E20,000 prize. To win the prize, the
chronometer would have to be accurate enough to allow the determination of longitude to within
half a degree after completing a voyage from England to the West Indies 2. Before claiming the
prize in 1774, a full forty seven years later, five iterations of the chronometers had been built (H-
1 through H-5). Of note throughout the process, keen competition, sabotage and even politics
played a role in determining the ultimate winner of the prize.
Responding to an unstated need in the late 1860's, Thomas Edison developed the world's
first stock ticker. By 1876, Thomas Edison had opened the worlds first corporate research center
at Menlo Park, New Jersey3. The sole purpose of the Invention Factory was to develop new and
commercially viable technologies as quickly as possible to meet the unstated and delight needs
of the world market. The phonograph is an excellent example of a product developed at Menlo
Park which met a delight need. All required materials, people and machinery were assembled on
site. This included 40 trained mechanics and technicians, chemicals, laboratory instruments,
electrical testing devices as well as a fully equipped machine shop. The Menlo Park research
centre had been in existence for two years before work began in earnest on the incandescent light
bulb. By the time Thomas Edison decided to join the race to develop the first commercially
viable incandescent light bulb, Joseph W. Swan! from England had a seventeen year head start.
Leveraging the benefits of a focused, cross functional and co-located team, Thomas Edison was
2 Sobel, Dava, 1995, "Longitude", Walker and Company, New York, ISBN 0-8027-1312-2, pp80 -8 3
3 Utterback, James, 1996, "Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation", Harvard Business School Press, Boston,
Massachusetts, ISBN 0-87584-740-4, pp 59-60
4 ibid
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able to gain the technical lead in incandescent light bulbs within twelve months. The now well
known quote from Thomas Edison that "Genius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine
percent perspiration" is an indication of the unpredictable and consequently iterative nature of
product development. The competition for this new market in incandescent light bulbs was
fierce with eight competing companies participating3.
In response to the stated needs of the Unites States government near the end of World
War II, Kelly Johnson of Lockheed Martin introduced the "Skunk Works" model of product
development. This model of product development was specifically focused on delivering
quantum leaps in technology for aerospace systems in very short time spans5. By co-locating the
project teams and removing external distractions, efficient communications were achieved. Also,
a key difference between the "Skunk Works" model and traditional phase gate models in use at
the time was that the team was allowed to tailor the existing development processes to efficiently
meet their project objectives. "Getting your hands dirty" was the modus operandi.
Of the fourteen basic operating rules of the Lockheed Martin "Skunk Works " model,
those of general applicability to industries outside of aerospace are single point of program
control, where the project team consists of only the most essential employees each with a high
degree of expertise, use a simple flexible configuration management systems and minimize the
requirement for external reports whilst recording important work thoroughly.
5 Forsberg, Kevin, Hal Mooz and Howard Cotterman, 2000, "Visualizing Project Management", 2 "d Ed, Wiley and
Sons Inc., New York, ISBN 0-471-35760-X
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By the late 1980's the Japanese had gained a reputation for being able to bring a myriad
of new and innovative products to market more quickly than anyone else. This was a complete
shift from a few decades before. Along with this apparent lead in product development, their
manufacturing sector was also strong whereas the American manufacturing sector was in a
general decline. Several key benchmark studies were carried out primarily in the automotive
industry by Womack, Jones and Roos6 . These studies highlighted the need and benefit of "Lean
Manufacturing" and "Concurrent Engineering" 7'8 . The traditional phase gate "over the wall"
product development process was no longer sufficient to meet the shorter cycle times required to
stay competitive through the 1980-90's. The benefit of concurrent engineering within the
automotive industry was definitively demonstrated by Clark and Fujimoto6 in 1987. Using a
sample of twenty nine "clean sheet" new vehicle development programs between, 1983 and 1987,
they found those using concurrent engineering practices on average took 1.7 million hours of
effort and 46 months to complete whereas those who did not use concurrent engineering
practices took on average 3 million hours of effort and 60 months to complete. Product design
for manufacturing and assembly became the new benchmark of product development processes
through the 1990's. Design for manufacturability guidelines provided by Boothroyd, Dewhurst9
and others were a major influence in reshaping traditional product development processes into
concurrent product development processes. Once again, shorter product development cycle
times were required to remain competitive.
6 Womack, James, Daniel T. Jones and Daniel Roos, 1990, "The Machine That Changed the World", MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, ISBN 0-06-097417-6, pp 104-137
7 Fine, Charles, 1998, "Clock Speed", Purseus Books, Reading, Massachusetts, ISBN 0-7382-0001-8
8 Lean manufacturing is a method by which only the absolute minimal material required to finish a product is
available at any one time in the factory, Concurrent engineering is the act of including design for manufacturing
(DFM) feedback into the design process at the very earliest stages of product development hence shortening the
overall development cycle.
9 Boothroyd, Geoffrey, Peter Dewhurst and Winston Knight, 2002, "Product Design for Manufacture and
Assembly", 2nd Ed., Marcel Dekker Inc., New York, ISBN 0-8247-0584-X
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By the mid to late 1990's, three major concepts emerged. The first concept was the
dominant design. A dominant design is defined as "the design within a product class that wins
the allegiance of the marketplace, the one that the competitors and innovators must adhere to if
they hope to command a significant marketfollowing "10 . A dominant design is typically not the
first to market but is defined through a process of consolidation within an industry. The IBM PC
is an example of a dominant design; it was neither first to market, superior in performance or
price.
The second major concept was disruptive technology and the evolution of industries. In
the book "The Innovators Dilemma ", Christiansen demonstrates that even well managed
companies that do everything correctly can fail. Using the metaphor that coping with the
relentless onslaught of technological change was akin to scrambling up a mudslide Christensen
writes "Clearly, the leaders in this industry did not fail because they became passive, arrogant,
or risk-averse or because they couldn't keep up with the stunning rate of technological change.
My technology mudslide hypothesis wasn't correct. "". As defined by Christensen, a disruptive
technology is a technology that originally only serves the lower end of a market but through
continuous technological advances ultimately displaces the incumbent technology. This can be
particularly damaging to established firms as outlined by Henderson and Clarke in their study of
the photolithographic alignment equipment industry, "Our analysis of the industry's history
0 Utterback, James, 1996, "Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation", Harvard Business School Press, Boston,
Massachusetts, ISBN 0-87584-740-4,pp 24-26
" Christensen, Clayton, 1997,"The Innovators Dilemma", Harper Business Press, New York, ISBN 0-06-662069-4
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suggests that a reliance on architectural knowledge derivedfrom experience with the previous
generation blinded the incumbent firms to critical aspects of the new technology" .
The third concept, called 3-D concurrent engineering 3 (3-DCE), was introduced by
Charles Fine (1998) in his book "Clock Speed". The concept extols the necessity to not only
consider the product and its manufacturability but also to consider the complete supply chain.
Charles Fine also recognized that not all industries evolve at the same pace. In order to
understand the differences, he coined the term clock speed as a measure of how frequently new
products are introduced to the market within a given industry. In the case of the Aerospace
industry, companies like Boeing, introduce new products once or twice a decade whereas
companies in the Infotainment industry, such as Disney, seek to launch a new motion picture
once a year.14 Therefore by applying Charles Fine's definition of clock speed, one can say that
the Aerospace industry has a much slower clock speed than the Infotainment industry.
Obviously, long term success is not defined by the quick introduction of a single product
or idea but rather an evolving product portfolio which targets the continuously changing needs of
the customer. Sighting examples from Hewlett-Packard, EMC, Black & Decker and Boeing
Meyer and Lehnerd 5 describe the benefits of commonality, standardization, compatibility and
choice of product platforms in "enabling companies to design technologically superior products
more easily "6. Therefore, decisions on the degree of commonality, standardization,
12 Henderson, Rebecca and Kim Clark, 1990, "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly, 35 (1990): p 24
"3 Fine, Charles, 1998, "Clock Speed", Purseus Books, Reading, Massachusetts, ISBN 0-7382-0001-8, pp 3-15.
" ibid
15 Meyer, Marc, H, Alvin P. Lehnerd, 1997, "The Power of Product Platforms", The Free Press, New York, ISBN 0-
684-82580-5, p 116ibid
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modularization and choice of platforms are critical to the long term success of an organization.
Unfortunately, driving commonality across multiple product's and platforms during a product
development cycle is very complex. Unlike re-use 7, commonality requires interaction at each
stage of the design process amongst many stakeholders on parts whose features, functions and
physical attributes are in many cases still being defined. This added level of complexity adds
significant communications cost and lead time to the product development process, typically
conflicting with the short term business objectives.
In retrospect, the ongoing need to continually reduce product development lead times
inevitably leads to a more integrated, concurrent and consequently complex 8 product
development environment. One in which the communication of information between individuals
is of paramount importance. As the number of stakeholders increases, within a product
development team, so does the need to communicate. The maximum number of pair wise
communications within a development team can be calculated using the relation , 
-1 2
where n represents the number of individual stakeholders. Commonality offers a possible
solution to this dilemma by simplifying the end state but this can only be achieved after investing
in added development time and cost up front.
In an effort to reduce future product development lead times and cost, many
organizations are faced with the dilemma of having to invest in extended product development
lead times in the short term due to the implementation of a commonality strategy. In fast clock
" In this context re-use refers to the choice of one product design team to utilize an already developed part typically
the desired state after the execution of a successful commonality strategy.
18 In this context complexity refers to the relative number of persons required to deliver a competitive solution to the
market in time.
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speed industries where the dominant design has not yet emerged or a new disruptive technology
is on the horizon this may not be an obvious decision. Also, architecturally committing oneself
to a single architecture which may or may not be able to utilize new and developing technologies
may in the long term be of more detriment than benefit.
1.2 Scope and Focus of Paper
This paper focuses specifically on the hardware development process associated with the
code division multiple access (CDMA) wireless access element commonly referred to as a base
transceiver station (BTS). The impact of imposing commonality constraints on new product
development lead time is investigated at four levels of integration; common part (ASIC),
common assembly (circuit pack), common field replaceable unit (module) and finally the
common platform (BTS).
The objective of the paper is to provide a general framework by which the implication of
a chosen commonality strategy when applied to similar telecommunications equipment can be
assessed a priori with respect to its impact on product development lead time. This paper is not
intended to define the optimum degree of commonality to pursue on a CDMA BTS nor
necessarily the best way to achieve the commonality strategy chosen.
The main interest in studying this particular industry is that it has several unique
attributes not commonly found elsewhere. The first is that the wireless segment of the
telecommunications industry has a particularly fast clock speed. One that has outstripped the
current product development lead time of most of the major incumbents. This makes product
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portfolio planning very challenging and uncertain. The second attribute is the split in
development effort between the hardware platform and the software that runs on it. In this
industry, only 30% of the design effort is focused on new hardware whilst the balance is reserved
for software development. However, one cannot have common software unless one first has
common hardware. The final attribute is the emergence of a dominant technology which will
ultimately lead to the convergence of several existing platforms within the industry.
1.3 Setting of Study
The data used for analysis in this paper was provided by Nortel Networks and reflects
work done in the period between 2000 and 2003 within the Wireless Networks line of business.
During this period, the company had four distinct lines of business namely Enterprise Networks,
Optical Networks, Wireline Networks and Wireless Networks. A brief corporate history with an
emphasis on the evolution of the Wireless Networks line of business is provided for context.
1.3.1 Nortel Networks Transition into Wireless Networks
Nortel Networks is a Canadian based telecommunications OEM with a long history of
innovation and growth'9 . The company grew from humble beginnings in 1882 as the telephone
set manufacturing department of the Bell Telephone Company of Canada. By the late 1980's,
Nortel Networks had established itself as the dominant global supplier of digital switching
equipment with its trademark DMS line of digital switches. Looking to expand into new market
'9 A more detailed chronology of Nortel Networks corporate history can be found in Appendix 2.
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areas the company entered the Wireless Networks business in 1992 through acquisition, alliances
and internal investment.
The move into the Wireless Networking business began with the acquisition of the
cellular systems business from NovAte 20 which at the time was a joint venture between two
regulated utilities within the province of Alberta, Canada. As part of the deal, Nortel Networks
also agreed to invest $12 M in a Calgary based centre of excellence to which 225 NovAtel
employees were transferred21 . This acquisition allowed Nortel Networks rapid entry to the
AMPS/TDMA wireless market within North America. This was quickly followed by a strategic
alliance with Matra Communications S.A. of France, enabling access to the fast growing GSM
wireless market in Europe. This strategic alliance ultimately resulted in the complete acquisition
of the Matra Communications GSM business by Nortel Networks including all assets and
employees2 2 . Also in 1992, the company established its new wireless headquarters in
Richardson, Texas. By the end of 1992, Nortel Networks had entered the Wireless Network
business.
1.3.2 Wireless Networks Organizational Structure 2000-2003
For the periods of interest to this paper, the Wireless Networks Access business had the
functional organizational structure represented in Figure 1 - Figure 4 for the period of 1999-2003.
20 Cooper H. Langford, Jaime R. Wood and Terry Ross, 2002, "Origins and Structure of the Calgary Wireless
Cluster", Faculty of Communication and Culture Working Paper, University of Calgary.
21 Ibid, NovAtel Communications was a joint venture between two regulated utilities, Alberta Government
Telephone and Nova Corporation a descendant of the Alberta Gas Trunk Lines. As part of the $38M deal Nortel
Networks agreed to establish a wireless center of excellence in Calgary to assist the government of Alberta in its
industry diversification initiative.
22 1999 Nortel Networks Annual Report, pp 100 note 6.
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For clarity, functions not directly tied to product development have been omitted such as Finance,
Marketing and Human Resources.
Pascal Debon
President
Wireless Networks
GSM CDMA TDMA/AMPS
GM GM GM
GSM CDMAITDMA UMTS
Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt.
CDMA
Development
Wireless Research
and Development Wireless Global
VP Operations
GSM UMTS WTL
Development Development Research
Figure 1 - Wireless Access Functional Organizational Structure 1999-2000
Pascal Debon
President
Wireless Networks
Wireless Access
Leader
WTL Wireless Global
Leader Operations
CDMA/TDMA GSM UMTS GSM UMTS CDMA
Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt. Development Development Development
Figure 2 - Wireless Access Functional Organization 2000-2001
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Pasca Debon
Wireless Networks
GSM CDMA/TDMA UMTS Wireless Global
Leader Leader Leader Operations
GSM GSM CDMA/TDMA CDMA UMTS UMTS
Development Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt. Development Product Line Mgt. Development
Figure 3 - Wireless Access Organizational Structure 2001-2002
Pascal Debon
President
Wireless Networks
GSM CDMA/TDMA UMTS Wireless
Leader Leader Leader Developrent
GSM CDMA/TDMA UMTS GSM CDMA UMTS
Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt. Product Line Mgt. Development Development Development
Wireless Global
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Figure 4 - Wireless Access Functional Organizational Structure 2002-2003
The functional mandates of the organizations shown in Figure 1- Figure 4 are;
Product Line Management (PLM) - are the business owners with ultimate responsibility
for overall profit and loss. Each PLM organization focuses specifically on a single technology
such as CDMA, GSM or UMTS. The PLM organization also has the responsibility of setting the
strategic evolution of the portfolio as well as defining which new product programs to fund
internally, externally or through OEM agreements.
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Development - are the technical owners of a specific portfolio with ultimate
responsibility for the portfolios technical compliance, bill of material cost and product field
performance. Each development organization focuses specifically on a single technology such
as CDMA, GSM or UMTS. A separate organization, known as the Wireless Technology Labs,
conducts basic research and at the time of this study reported directly into the President of
Wireless Networks. Although the two groups interact significantly, the formal reporting
structures are significantly independent converging only at the Presidential level.
Global Operations (GO) - responsible for overall execution of the day to day business as
well as management of the cash-to-cash cycle. Operations control the standard cost of the
product as well as setting quality metrics and yield metrics and can therefore influence the profit
and loss of the PLM organization directly.
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1.3.3 Wireless Networks Major Operating Locations 2000-2003
Between 2000 and 2003 the Wireless Networks line of business operated out of five
major locations. Table 1 provides a summary of functions and the locations from which they
operated. Bolded table entries indicate prime site for each identified function and business
within Wireless Networks.
Function
Location President & Product Line Development Operations
General Managers Management
Dallas, USA GSM/UMTS/CDMA CDMA/UMTS
Ottawa, Canada CDMA CDMA/UMTS
Calgary, Canada CDMA CDMA CDMA
Paris, France GSM/UMTS GSM/UMTS
Chateaudun, France GSM/UMTS
Table 1 - Main geographic locations of the Wireless Networks line of business 2000 to 2003
1.3.4 Time to Market Product Development Process 2000-2003
The development projects studied in this paper were all executed within the framework of
the Nortel Networks Time to Market (TTM) product development process. This product
development process was introduced as part of the corporate transformation strategy known as
the "Right Angle Turn "23. Rather than traditional gates with fixed milestones, TTM uses event-
23 The "Right Angle Turn" refers to a corporate transformation strategy adopted under John Roth in 1997 which was
intended to empower decision making at the lowest levels of the organizations for the purpose of creating a truly
agile, market driven organization. One of many outcomes was the Time to Market (TTM) development process.
24 of 143
driven, fact-based, business-oriented decisions which occur at specific milestones called business
decision points (BDP) as a mechanism to authorize continued funding. The TTM process
emphasizes risk-taking, employee decision making and a focus on rapid product development in
a cross functional team environment for the sole purpose of meeting time to market objectives.
As discovered by the project teams studied in this paper, a major difference between the
traditional phase gate processes and the TTM process was that the degree of overlapping
development activities increased dramatically when using the TTM process. Typically, the next
design iteration would start well in advance of fully completing the validation cycle of the
previous design iteration.
The typical Wireless Networks TTM project team is organized as shown in Figure 5. The
Integrated Product Team Leader (IPTL) is ultimately responsible for the delivery of the new
product to market against agreed to quality, product cost and schedule targets. The IPTL reports
into the Product Management Team (PMT), a cross-functional decision making team chaired by
the General Manager or delegate. The PMT is accountable for portfolio strategy, resource
allocation, and ongoing portfolio management decisions related to market timing, customer
needs and business priorities.
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The TTM process has five distinct development phases as shown in Figure 6 below. The
unclear delineation between design phases is intentional.
Strategic
Readiness
Market
Readines
Business Decision Points
Business
s Readiness
Customer
Readiness
Idea Opportunity D
Phase Phase
Intent
efinition Implementation Deployment
Phase Phase Phase
Alpha Beta Customer Ready
Design Phases
Figure 6 - Phases of TTM Product Development Process
1.4 Approach
1.4.1 Methodology
The issue of understanding the implications of a chosen commonality strategy on product
development lead time was approached by analyzing four separate product development
programs within the Nortel Networks Wireless business. Each of the chosen programs
represents a different level of assembly within the CDMA BTS system. The key stakeholders in
each of the four development teams were interviewed and data gathered. The survey questions
were developed within the Three Lenses framework for the purpose of capturing the strategic,
political and cultural views of the stakeholders with respect to their role on the development
24 See Appendix 3 of this paper for a complete copy of the survey questions used.
25 Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen and Westney, 1999, "Organizational Behavior & Processes",
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, South-Western College Publishing, Boston MA, ISBN 0-538-87546-1
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project. The key attributes of the survey questions in relation to the development projects chosen
is in Table 2.
Increasing Degree of Program Complexity >
Attribute Rx Channelizer Digital Transmit Radio Module Basestation
ASIC Receive Card
Time to Quality 1 2 2 3
Time to Cost 3 3 1 2
Time to Market 2 1 3 1
Multi Business X X X
Multi Site X X X X
Business Climate Growth Growth Contraction Contraction
Table 2 - Key Attributes of Three Lenses Questionnaire
The data gathered during the survey was analyzed in order to provide insight into the
impact of organizational structure on product development lead time with respect to the
implementation of a desired commonality strategy. Correlations are made between degrees of
commonality and top level programmatic metrics such as quality, product cost and time to
market. An evaluation of barriers preventing joint gains and acceptable compromises to be
achieved amongst share holders in joint development programs is then discussed. The cultural
data gathered for all projects is then analyzed using the three level entity model developed by
Edgar H. Schein26 of the Sloan School of Management. The final analysis is done to ensure that
the culture of the Wireless Networks organization did not change significantly between projects
or during the period 2000-2003.
2 6 ibid, M2 pp 76-89. Schein, Edgar H., February 1990, "Organizational Culture", American Psychologist, American
Psychologist Association
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In instances where detailed programmatic data was available, a quantitative analysis was
performed using a task based design structure matrices (DSM) to analyze the implication of
pursuing commonality and not pursuing commonality. Effects modeled include stochastic
durations, probabilistic iterations, learning effects, resource constraints, parallel tasks and
overlapping tasks. The implication of commonality is then discussed.
1.4.2 Structure of Thesis
This remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter two of this thesis provides
a brief industry overview with a special emphasis on the mobile wireless networking segment,
current technologies and the impact of network element convergence. This is followed by an
architectural discussion of the CDMA BTS using the organizational process methodology (OPM)
framework and how this element fits into the overall global telecommunications network.
Chapter three summarizes existing literature reviewed for this thesis and highlights differences
between this thesis and previous work. A brief description of the Three Lenses framework and
the DSM analysis techniques is also provided. Chapter 4 contains four sections each addressing
one of the four case studies conducted. Chapter five provides a discussion of the results and
chapter six contains the conclusions. Final recommendations can be found in chapter 7.
29 of 143
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Telecommunications Industry
The modem telecommunications industry originated with the invention of the telephone
and the subsequent first telephone call between Alexander Graham Bell and his assistant Thomas
Watson on March 10, 1876. Today, the telecommunications industry represented approximately
one hundred and eighty billion dollars of capital equipment (Capex) spending annually27, is
global, increasingly competitive and continues to evolve rapidly. To fully understand the rate of
change in the telecommunications industry, consider that it took 100 years to establish a half-
billion network terminations 28 and only six or so more years to double that number29.
As new means of communication were developed, new networks were deployed to
service these new and growing market segments. Today's global telecommunications network
reflects this piecemeal evolution and as a result consists of disparate networks each addressing a
unique service category such as telephony, telex, switched-packet data and so on. In all, there
are seven network types as defined in Table 3. This is no longer an ideal situation considering
the high cost of network management today. A "greatly" simplified view of today's global
telecommunications network is shown in Figure 7.
27 2003, "Guide to Networks and Telecommunications Equipment", Lehman Brothers Global Equity Research.
28 Network termination - the industry term to describe service points on the network.
29 Nortel History, Nortel Networks Corporate Web Site - http://www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/corptime/
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Network Name Main Function Characteristics Deployed
Public Switched The original telephone network. - local access, analog .3-3.4KHz; 1876
Telephone 
- full duplex connection;Network
(PSTN) - switched bandwidth, 64 kbps
Optimized for fixed voice transfer.
Integrated Services Service integrated network for - local access, digital 64 kbps; 1980
Digital Network digital communications between 
- max. access rate 30 x 64 kbps
(ISDN) user interfaces.-ma.acsrte3x64bp Optimized for fixed voice and multimedia
transfer.
Public Land Mobile to mobile telephony - air interface standards: 1983
Mobile Network communications as well as FDMA-Frequency Division-I9.2kbps*
(PLMN) communication - via PSTN/ISDN gateways - with fixed TDMA-Time Division - 9.6kbps*
telephony subscriptions. CDMA-Code Division 
-9.6kbps*
*MA = Multiple Access
Optimized for mobile voice transfer.
Signaling System Packet switched bearer network - connectionless (packets treated are 1983
Number 7 supporting communication individually)
(SS7) between networks. Also support - carries message signal units between
short message communication processors in the telecommunications
between subscribers. network.
X.25/Frame Relay Cost-effective bearer network X.25 -speed 64 kpbs 1989
Packet Switched for interconnecting two LANs. Frame Relay - 2Mbps
Publi DataProvides access from the
Network PSTN/ISDN to the internet Optimized for data transfer.facilitating "home surfing".
(PSPDN)
Asynchronous ATM integrates multiplexing Variable bit rate 2Mbps to more than 1991
Transfer Mode and switching functions, is well 100Mbps.
(ATM) and suited for bursty traffic. Optimized for high speed multimedia.
Broadband ISDN
Internet Transfer Packet switched using a Internet protocol can technically transfer 1992
Control common address structure. any application across any existing
Protocol/Internet Unlike X.25, Frame Relay or network. However, quality of service may
Protocol ATM the internet is an end to suffer due to bandwidth limitations. The
(TCP/IP) end application connecting any internet is a network of networks rathertwo computers globally. than a network in and of itself.
Table 3 - Components of Global Telecommunications Network30
LM Ericsson, 2002, "Understanding Telecommunications", Lund University Press, Sweden
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Figure 7 - Simplified View of Global Telecommunications Network
Connection to the network is provided through local telephone companies, data network
or internet service providers. The service providers operate at what is known as the Network
Edge. Depending on the services being offered, the physical connection to the network can be
realized using mobile or fixed wireless access, optical, twisted pair copper wire and cable.
The equipment enabling the traditional network shown in Figure 7 was, until recently,
dominantly supplied by major international companies such as Lucent Technologies (USA),
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Nortel Networks (Canada), Alcatel (France), L.M. Ericsson (Sweden) and Siemens (Germany)
each benefiting from the heavily regulated telecommunications monopolies within their
respective countries.
2.2 Convergence and the Transformation of the Network
With the advent of the internet, world wide de-regulation of the telecommunications
industry and the introduction of mobile wireless access, the industry has undergone dramatic
change. With respect to deregulation and then internet, Nicholas Negroponte of the MIT media
lab wrote "Worse, the entire economic model ofpricing in telecommunications is about to fall
apart. Today's tariffs are determined per minute, per mile, or per bit, all three of which are
rapidly becoming bogus measures "31 When asked whether the evolution of the internet was
significant, Andrew Grove of Intel Corporation wrote, "Anything that can affect industries
whose total revenue base is many hundreds of billions of dollars is a big deal. "32. In this
increasingly competitive global market place, network convergence and transformation are
required in order for incumbent service providers to remain competitive.
The vision of the new, transformed network is one in which disparate network elements
are converged onto single architectural platforms serving the Client, Wireless Access, Network
Services, Multi-services Packet, VoIP, Multi-services Optical and Element Management aspects
of the network architecture. The Nortel Networks view of the transformed network topology can
be seen in Figure 8. Also, the convergence of disparate network elements into single
31 Negroponte, Nicholas, 1995, "being digital", Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York, ISBN 0-679-43919.
32 Grove, Andres S., 1996,"Only the Paranoid Survive", Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., New York,
ISBN 0-385-48258-2.
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architectural platforms is rapidly reducing the need for highly specialized telecommunications
equipment.
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Figure 8 - Nortel Networks Transformed Network Topology 3
The edge of the transformed network is typified by routers, soft switches and computer
servers consequently changing the competitive environment within the telecommunications
equipment industry as shown in Figure 9.
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3 Source Nortel Networks
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Figure 9 - Changing Competitive Environment3 4
Revenue growth opportunities are viewed as having migrated from the traditional core
portion of the network to providing value at the edge of the network through ubiquitous voice,
data and multimedia services to the end user as shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10 - Transformed Network User Value35
As well as deregulation and the internet, the third area which is rapidly evolving is that of
mobile wireless access. As one of the most cost effective ways to deploy last mile connectivity,
mobile wireless access networks are rapidly being deployed throughout the developing world.
With the introduction of third generation (3G) standards, there are two competing air
interfaces to choose from, namely CDMA 2000 (CDMA North America) and W-CDMA (UMTS
Europe). Technically, both are similar enough that it is possible to have a common base
transceiver station (BTS) architecture servicing both standards. Within the industry, Ericsson
has chosen to develop a fully common BTS servicing both UMTS and CDMA markets. Lucent
Technologies and Nortel Networks, two major competitors within this segment, have chosen to
pursue lesser degrees of commonality between their BTS platforms whereas Nokia Corporation
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3 Source Nortel Networks
has chosen to pursue a completely open non proprietary architecture through support of the Open
Base Station Architecture Initiative.
2.3 Mobile Wireless Access
For the purpose of this paper, we will only discuss the CDMA and UMTS wireless access
nodes commonly referred to as BTS. The topology of the CDMA mobile wireless access
network is given in Figure 11 as reference. As the technologies are quite similar the deployment
of UMTS BTS is comparable with CDMA BTS. As the access node, the BTS is the most
heavily deployed network element having one BTS per wireless cell.
Home Location Registry
BT (L)PSTN
BSC Mobile Telephone Exchange
(MTX) Internet
Inter Working Function
(IWF) Intranet
Private Packet
EP
Network
Policy Services Pack Data 
Services Node
(PDSN)
Inter Working Function
(IWF)
Figure I I - CDMA Wireless Access Topology
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Literature Review
The benefits of implementing a commonality strategy have been well documented in the
literature. Meyer and Lehnerd, (1997)36, site several successful examples from Hewlett-Packard,
EMC and Black & Decker in which commonality across platforms was embraced and
implemented successfully. In fast clock speed industries, such as consumer electronics,
Sanderson and Uzemeri, (1994)37, use the case of the Sony Walkman as an example of where a
good use of process and platform commonality were essential elements of a short time to market
development cycle. Using queue theory, Reinertsen, (1997)38, shows how prudent use of
common parts can reduce uncertainty in the product development cycle ultimately leading to
shorter overall development times.
The organizational complexities associated with the implementation of commonality
strategies have also been studied. Cratty and Sahutske, (2003)39, analyze various organizational
structures with respect to their impact on the implementation of a commonality strategy. A
framework of metrics by which to measure the long term benefits of a commonality/platform
strategy within a design firm were derived by Meyer, Tertzakian and Utterback, (1997)40.
Further insights into the impact of organizational structure on the executions of tasks can be
3 6 Meyer, Marc H. and Alvin P. Lehnerd, 1997, "The Power of Product Platforms", New York, The Free Press,
ISBN 0-684-82580-5
" Sanderson, Susan and Mustafa Uzumeri, 1995, "Managing Product Famalies: The case of the Sony Walkman",
Research Policy 24 (1995) 761-782., Elsevier Science B.V.
38 Reinertsen, Donald G., 1997, "Managing the Design Factory", The Free Press, New York, ISBN 0-684-83991-1
39 Cratty, Lisa and Matthew Sahutske, 2003, "Modeling & Developing a Commonality Strategy in the Automotive
Industry", Thesis, System Design and Management, MIT.
40 Meyer, Marc, Tertzakian, Peter and James Utterback, 1997,"Metrics for Managing Research and Development in
the Context of the Product Family", Management Science, Vol 43, Issue 1 (Jan., 1997), 88-111
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analyzed using a three level entity model developed by Edgar H. Schein4l of the Sloan School of
Management.
The impact of communication between design groups working on an integrated
development project has been analyzed by Sosa, Eppinger and Roles, (2000)42. In their study,
they sought to understand the effects of product architecture on technical communication in
product development organizations. This work extensively uses the design structure matrix43
(DSM) to analyze the impact of organizational structure and architecture on product
development lead time.
The current literature does not appear to address product development programs in which
software development constitutes a full 70% of the effort and typically takes longer than the
development of the hardware platform itself. Most telecommunication equipment falls into this
category. In a fast clock speed industry such as telecommunications, the implications of Time to
Market, Time to Cost and Time to Quality need to be explicitly considered as they are not always
equally important.
4' Schein, Edgar H., February 1990, "Organizational Culture", American Psychologist, American Psychologist
Association
42 Sosa, Manuel, Eppinger, Steven and Craig Rowles, 2000, "Understanding the Effects of Product Architecture on
Technical Communication in Product Development Organizations", Sloan School of Management Working Paper
Number 4130.
43Cho, Soo-Heng and Steven Eppinger, "Product Development Process Modelling", Proceedings of ASME 2001
Design Engineering Technical Conference, DETc2001/DTM-21691, Pittsburgh PA, September 9-12, 2001
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4 CASE STUDIES
The following case studies pertain to development activities between 2000 and 2003
within the Nortel Networks CDMA business. The product hierarchy of a typical CDMA BTS is
shown in using standard Object Process Methodology 44 (OPM) nomenclature. There are a total
of five levels of hierarchical design decomposition for a CDMA BTS.
RAE Ma& & MadIiiu Eii [%A r C, c c O A
MFIVA&IK Mftw BlvdMu *~rxo1~*
YM1Y7WA Y 850S5
Figure 12 - CDMA BTS Level 0 and 1
44 Dori, Dov, 2002, "Object-Process Methodology", Springer-Verlag, Berlin, ISBN 3-540-65471-2
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Figure 15 - CDMA BTS Level 3 and 4
4.1 Multi-Standard Receive Channelizer ASIC
The multi-standard Receive Channelizer ASIC (Rx ASIC) supports both UMTS
(Universal Mobile Telephone System) and CDMA 3G standards. The Rx ASIC is capable of
supporting up to six 2G channels or two 3G channels which are nominally split equally for main
and diversity reception. The Rx channelizer performs digital channel selection consisting of:
ADC interfacing, quadrature demodulation (optional), channel tuning, channel selection
(filtering), AGC (automatic gain control), and interfacing to the high speed serialization device
(HSSPC-II). The Rx ASIC is implemented using the Texas Instrument's GS30 1.8-V CMOS
standard cell technology45 . The Rx ASIC is a part on the digital transmit receive (DTRx) printed
45 Morris, Brad, 2000, "Multi-Standard Channelizer General Specification", Issue 3.1, Nortel Networks
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circuit assembly located at the fifth level of product hierarchy shown in Figure 15. A functional
block representation of the RF/IF and digital signal paths are given in Figure 16 for reference.
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Figure 16 - CDMA BTS RF/IF Signal Flow Functional Block Diagram
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L
Physically the part is realized in an industry standard plastic one hundred and ninety six
ball grid array package shown in Figure 17.
I 00 ;D-7
4 4~Q~~ t O~0
Figure 17 - Rx Channelizer Package
In 1997, a corporate mandate was given to the Wireless Technology Lab (WTL), the
corporate research group for wireless technology within Nortel Networks, to develop a wideband
experimental system. The purpose of this wideband experimental system was to gauge industry
interest in wireless 3G technologies such as UMTS and CDMA lxRTT as well as to demonstrate
Nortel Networks competency and commitment to the wireless market. By 1998, the wideband
experimental system was being demonstrated at various trade shows globally. The
implementation of the required DSP functionality within the wideband experimental system had
been accomplished using field programmable gate arrays (FPGA).
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Interest in wireless 3G technology, within the industry, proved to be strong and the focus
within WTL shifted to their secondary mandate which was the commercialization of new
technologies. The following is three lenses analysis of the multi standard Rx and TX
Channelizer ASICs development project focusing on the implications of the commonality
strategy chosen on product development lead time.
4.1.1 The Three Lenses
Strategic Lens
The main thrust of the commercialization effort was to consolidate the DSP functionality
implemented using multiple FPGAs on the wideband experimental system onto two ASICs, one
for receive (Rx) and the other for transmit (Tx). Both the Rx and Tx ASICs were to be capable
of servicing the future 3G needs of both the CDMA and UMTS businesses. The leader of the
WTL organization felt that a common ASIC development program between WTL, CDMA and
UMTS would offer three advantages to Nortel Networks. The cost benefit in using an ASIC vs.
FPGA was approximately $8 vs. $400 respectively. The schedule for a collaborative ASIC
development could benefit greatly by leveraging the experience gained by the WTL team in
working on the experimental wideband system. As well, the quality of the resultant ASICs
would be high as each functional block required by the ASIC had already been proven on the
wideband experimental system. The functional blocks with the exception of the peak power
ratio (PPR) block were therefore available in an advanced prototype state before the
CDMA/UMTS architects had even a chance to read the 3GPP specifications.
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The WTL team promoted the idea of a common channelizer ASIC through a traveling
road show to the Paris, Calgary and Ottawa R&D centers. The presentation was made to each
respective general manager (GM), product line management organization (PLM) and product
development organization. The basic premise for the promotion was one of reduced cost and
reduced time to market. As captured in the quote below the WTL team felt it was a Win-Win-
Win proposition to all stakeholders.
"As WTL, we did not have an inherent interest in either business and were therefore able
to define a neutral set of requirements for both businesses. We provided a non biased view of the
problem and the solution. I personally acted as the architect. Our interest was to achieve
commonality for the overall benefit of Nortel Networks. " - WTL Development Manager.
The agreement to proceed with a joint development program on a common Channelizer
ASIC was reached at the director level within the CDMA and UMTS product development
organizations. As there were no objections to the proposal from either GM or either PLM
organization, the decision to go ahead was strictly borne by the technology teams within Nortel
Networks. The CDMA development team adopted the proposal quickly as they already had a
single carrier ASIC solution which they could fall back on if things didn't work out. The UMTS
team on the other hand was leaning toward an FPGA based implementation strategy due to a bad
experience with ASICs development on the GSM product. With time, the WTL team who had
trialed multiple schemas for channelization and viewed the use of FPGAs as a non realizable
option were able to persuade the UMTS team to abandon the FPGA approach and focus their
effort on a joint development program for an ASIC.
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One of the primary drivers leading to the receptiveness of the CDMA and UMTS
development organizations in accepting the proposal was the general shortage of qualified
resources within both organizations in 1999-2000. The proposal provided both organizations
with a means to get the job done with minimal cost and time. Both design teams provided
resources to the detailed design effort and both design teams ratified all of the basic decisions for
the project. Participating in this way was viewed as less labor intensive for both the CDMA and
UMTS product development teams.
In essence, the WTL group became responsible for generating the project plan for the
ASIC development, getting approval to proceed from both of the stakeholder teams as well as
securing funding for the project. The WTL group acted as the technology vendor to both the
CDMA and UMTS lines of business. In this role, the WTL group helped consolidate the
requirements in the form of a system design specification (SDS) from both stakeholder groups
and formulate a general specification (GS) which was ratified amongst the three stakeholders
WTL, CDMA and UMTS.
Upon ratification of the GS, a prime from the WTL organization was put in place for the
purpose of facilitating the review of new feature requests from either business. Factors such as
cost and schedule were considered and both teams had equal veto power on any new feature
being proposed. The PLM organizations from each line of business were now actively involved
in the process as the non recurring engineering (NRE) costs were being shared between the two
lines of business.
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The development team consisted of approximately ten dedicated resources assigned from
the WTL organization with one or two resources from each of UMTS and CDMA providing
inputs. The development effort was managed under one functional manager within the WTL
organization who was responsible for both the Tx and Rx channelizer ASICs. The partitioning
of the design was defined by the DTRx card interfaces. Since the WTL team were involved in
designing both the ASICs and the DTRx card, defining the interfaces between them was straight
forward. The interdependence between tasks on this program was organized in a reciprocal
manner as shown in Figure 18.
CDMA UNITS
Development Development
Wireless
Technology Lab
Figure 18 - Rx Channelizer Program Structure (Reciprocal Interdependence) 46
Feedback from those interviewed indicates that the structure of the project reduced churn
primarily due to the extra effort invested in ratifying the GS between the two groups.
46 James Thompson, 1967, introduced a topology of task interdependence - reciprocal, sequential and pooled.
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"Once the specifications were ratified between the three organizations there was never
any force to disengage from the commonality mandate set." - WTL Development Manager.
"After the GS was ratified it went very well." -- WTL Feature Review Prime.
"The whole project was very structured around the commonality goal. There was no
doubt that the channelizers would remain common. The General specification was consolidated
and written by WTL. WTL also drove all of the design reviews. My counterpart and I would
communicate via email outside the formal reviews. Because of the time difference between
Calgary and Paris, this worked surprisingly well. I would ask a question and the next morning I
would have an answer and vice versa." - CDMA Design Prime.
"The commonality was managed by WTL. Both sides worked on their own with WTL
pulling ideas from both sides together. In essence, I viewed WTL as a node that I was working
with. There was a definite need for structure to achieve commonality as the CDMA and UMTS
requirements were different." - UMTS Design Prime.
The impact to product development lead time, due to the commonality strategy chosen,
manifests itself in several key areas. As mentioned above, the serial activity of requirements
gathering and synthesis, proved to be the most time consuming part of the project taking a full
seven months to complete. This was estimated as a 200% increase in effort and time in
comparison to a no commonality. Although the involvement of multiple groups early on slowed
the project during the requirements definition phase, this proved to be beneficial during the later
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stages of the project as unnecessary churn was more thoroughly challenged. This was referred to
as the "churn dampening" effect by the team. Also as the functionality requested by each group
differs somewhat, some ASIC gates were "common use" and others were not. Estimates by the
team indicate that 50-75% of the blocks were different contributing to approximately 30% more
effort on the detailed block design portion of the development cycle. This effect would be
similar to carrying extra functionality on a part in order to maintain commonality across more
platforms. The physical manufacturing process, which accounts for 25% of the total work,
however, remained unaffected by the design differences between the UMTS and CDMA
applications. The ASIC test and verification work was carried out by the CDMA and UMTS
lines of business independently. The total duration of this activity was equal to that of a non
common part. However, the effort was double as the two teams worked in parallel.
During this program, time to market (TTM) dominated the metrics by which the program
was being measured. There was only one schedule slip which was accepted by both the CDMA
and UMTS PLM organizations as other portions of the larger 3G wireless program into which
this ASIC development fit were even later. Even though the program was driven aggressively,
the quality achieved was considered to be very high. The commonality strategy once set was
maintained and successfully implemented throughout the program. Four years after the
completion of the development effort the common Rx channelizer ASIC is still viewed as a very
high quality and cost effective part.
"The quality of the ASIC was never questioned, by definition it had to be right. This was
also the cheapest option in achieving the required functionality." - WTL Design Manager
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Strategically, the team was formed for the sole purpose of developing a common
channelizer ASIC. The CDMA and UMTS product development teams were involved in this
activity for the sole purpose of ensuring that the end product would meet the requirements of
each respective business.
Geographically, the teams were spread across three locations namely, Ottawa, Calgary
and Paris. Surprisingly, based on interview feedback, these geographical differences and
multiple time zones did not drive up the number of meetings held. In some cases, it was actually
beneficial to have multiple time zones as work progressed through the night. In other cases, it
was not and travel was required. Fortunately, the preference of the Paris team was to start work
later in the day relative to their counterparts in Calgary who preferred to start early. However,
there are indications that the amount of time spent traveling increased significantly for the team
members in the Calgary location. Language was a bit of an issue, especially with
teleconferences. However, most people at the Ottawa site have a working knowledge of the
French language. Language differences were therefore not a significant impact to the project.
Strategically, the initiative was well aligned with the TTM, TTC and TTQ metrics of both
lines of business. The initiative was also well aligned with the secondary mandate of the WTL
group to commercialize their research technology into existing or new products. The activities
of each stakeholder were closely linked (reciprocal interdependence) reflecting the complex and
iterative nature of the task being executed. The grouping of activities was also congruent with
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the desired output of a common channelizer ASIC. Having both lines of business participate was
a key factor in ensuring that the part met all requirements.
The Political Lens
In all, there were five primary stakeholders involved in the development of the common
channelizer ASIC. At the highest level, these can be grouped into the WTL corporate function,
the CDMA Development and PLM organizations and the UMTS development and PLM
organizations. The functional mandates of each of these groups as well as their roles and
responsibilities are given in section 1.3.2 of this paper. At the time of this project, the CDMA
business was under tremendous pressure to develop 3G capability within their portfolio and the
UMTS business was under tremendous pressure to introduce a new 3G platform. Funding for
development was not an issue as both businesses viewed 3G capability as vital to their future
growth and survival. However, both the CDMA and UMTS businesses were resource
constrained. Hiring and training new resources was viewed as an impractical method of
achieving the business objective. The WTL organization had the required resources and skills
needed to do the work due in large part to the experience gained in developing the wideband
experimental system.
The WTL organization also wanted to establish themselves as the DSP center of
excellence within Nortel Networks continuing to justify their existence as a separate entity which
was not aligned with either line of business. As part of the WTL organizations mandate, a
certain percentage of their annual budget was to be allocated to commercializing new technology.
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There were indications that previous attempts to commercialize new technologies out of the
WTL organization had a mixed track record of success.
In the WTL proposal for a common development effort on the channelizer ASIC, the
WTL organization would pay for and supply the labor and the CDMA and UMTS businesses
would pay for the NRE which was the bulk of the expense of the program. In this proposal, it
appears that the zero-sum game47, the natural point in which power constrains organizational
choices to the current entrenched interests, was altered. Through the generation and sales of the
proposal, the WTL organization was able to show that the overall zero-sum pie could be
expanded in everyone's interest. When viewing "power as the ability to get things done, one
can better visualize the character ofpower as aforce that is both constraining and producing
Ultimately, the WTL organization was able to gain the trust of the CDMA and UMTS
lines of business by demonstrating capability through the wideband experimental system and
through the structure of the proposed development team in which a high level of transparency
and fairness to each business could be ensured. As commonality did not impact or restrict either
business from achieving or receiving their requested functionality, the issue of a joint
development program was viewed as a business decision. It was borne out of the technology
organizations as it was basically a transfer of design authority, at the piece part level of assembly,
from the CDMA and UMTS development organizations to the WTL organization.
47 Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen and Westney, 1999, "Organizational Behavior & Processes",
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, South-Western College Publishing, Boston MA, ISBN 0-538-87546-1
48 ibid
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After project kickoff, the members of the development team viewed their work as strictly
technical and were effectively buffered from outside influences by the WTL design manager.
"At the time, I had no visibility of the direct business impact of what I had been asked to
do. I had no influence on the commonality decision; I was decoupled and isolated from it."-
CDMA Design Prime.
"We received the requirement from PLM to drive for a common Rx Channelizer ASIC.
We subsequently tried to influence the decision based on business needs at the time."- UMTS
Design Prime.
Discussions around timelines and funding were limited to the WTL development
manager and the CDMA and UMTS PLM representatives who pushed the schedule very hard.
The fact that the pursuit of commonality did not impact or restrict either business from achieving
or receiving their requested functionality was viewed as beneficial and it allowed the team to
focus primarily on the technical issues. However, the CDMA line of business still felt it
necessary to place the following constraints on the program prior to agreeing to proceed;
"The development schedule had to meet the business needs, the new ASIC had to be at
least as good as the existing ASIC and the project had to be able to cope with last minute CDMA
churn." - ASIC Architect
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The UMTS business had the tightest schedule and no backup plan. This changed when
the UMTS market fell out toward the end of 2000 but TTM was the major driver during the
program kick-off and requirements gathering phase. Given the mandate of the WTL group and
their role in this project, it is clear that they had the most at stake if a high quality level was not
achieved. Although time to market was a significant concern, schedule requirements between
UMTS and CDMA lines of business were disjointed. One team wanted more functions added
which of course took more time. As both teams needed the ASIC to work, a solution had to be
reached within the commonality strategy chosen.
In order to ensure equity, each stakeholder group had veto power, spent equal amounts of
money and had equal representation on the ratification team4 9. Tradeoffs were performed using
a majority voting system as there were three groups involved. If one group said something was
wrong, the others had to check it out. If two groups said there was something wrong, then the
error had to be fixed. The three key technical members of the team got along well and respected
each others skills and knowledge. Over time, the role of each key technical contributor evolved.
For instance, the role of the WTL development prime evolved into the person who looked at how
the channelizer would ultimately be used. They effectively transitioned from a low level block
designer to functional architect. According to the team, the collaborative decision making model
was viewed as necessary although it was at times more cumbersome to follow.
There were also technical constraints (targets) for cost, power consumption and ASIC pin
designations. Any new features that fit into these constraints were typically rolled in. The major
49 At the time neither the CDMA nor UMTS businesses were dominant over each other. This was based on the fact
that the future growth potential of UMTS was given credit to the point of equality with the existing size of the
CDMA business.
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differences occurred at the detailed level where the impacts where minimal. Each of the
sponsors CDMA and UMTS would document what they wanted and the WTL feature review
prime would respond with a cost and schedule impact when applicable. The development
representatives from each of the sponsor groups would approve or disapprove of new requests
and in the case that an escalation was required the PLM organization from each sponsoring
organization would make the ultimate call. This apparently only happened once and even then
the commonality strategy was never challenged or changed. As the WTL group was also
designing the next higher level assembly, the DTRx card and the high speed serial link (HSSL),
system interfaces had been defined by them already making the ASIC more straightforward in its
implementation.
"It was excellent for both CDMA and WTL. The result was excellent. A good example of
what can be done together." - UMTS Design Prime
The Cultural Lens
The significant change in Nortel Networks corporate culture came in 1997 with the Right
Hand Turn initiative headed by John Roth. Terms such as web speed and time to market became
the new hallmarks of corporate communication as the organization underwent its transformation
from a traditional telecommunications equipment provider into an agile internet defining
corporation. The traditional culture of employee entitlement was rapidly replaced with a culture
of employee differentiation. It was well known that differentiating one self from the rest of
one's peers led to larger salary increases and bonuses. Stock options were also introduced as
56 of 143
incentives to the engineering staff for the first time and became extremely popular as the Nortel
Networks share price continued to defy gravity and rise in value every week.
At each site within Nortel Networks, this transformation took on its own subculture based
largely on the sites origins. The subcultures of the three organizations involved in this
development project are given below.
The Wireless Technology Labs originated out of the original Bell Northern Research
group in Ottawa. The group has a large proportion of engineers and scientists with graduate
degrees. Many of whom are known within the industry as experts in their field. The
organization focuses on new wireless technology and the research associated with it. They do
not have to deal with the daily "noise " associated with running a business or servicing an urgent
customer need. The employees within WTL typically have a Nortel Networks mindset and view
the organization as one entity trying to optimize the whole rather than each of the parts
independently. The engineers interviewed from the WTL organization view themselves as being
less conservative than their UMTS counterparts in France and more conservative than their
CDMA counterparts in Calgary.
The CDMA organization originated out of the purchase of Novatel Wireless. It is viewed
as entrepreneurial and is typically seen as taking unnecessarily large risks both technically and
programmatically.
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"Everything was going to be successful and we had complete confidence in everything we
did Wireless Networks was still small enough within Nortel Networks that we were able to take
much larger risks than we can today." - CDMA Design Prime.
Decision making is consensus based and employees are encouraged to communicate their
opinion during the consensus process. Once consensus has been reached, the whole team rapidly
falls in line and executes against the agreed to plan. The subculture is one of very little argument
or passive resistance once consensus has been reached. The CDMA development engineers
pride themselves in their can-do attitude and view it as a differentiator within Nortel Networks.
They typically work in large teams with specific specializations for each team member.
The UMTS organization originated out of the acquisition of Matra communications and
is viewed as being very conservative. The organization typically wants to study multiple options
before proceeding. For example, the UMTS team was very averse to the use of ASICs. This
was due primarily to a bad experience a few years earlier on GSM in which the ASICs were not
only late but of poor quality. As with the CDMA organization, the UMTS development
organization prefers to do things themselves. They view themselves as a rational entity that
continues to operate within its own operational norms even when faced with contradictory
direction or mandates from outside their organization. The UMTS organization typically works
in teams as well but rely on their engineers to have a more global view of the overall system
rather than specialization.
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"I don't understand the Nortel Networks culture; I don't see a clear line to follow. The
lines change constantly. We do what we think is right. We have the same culture today as we
have had for the last 4 years." - Anonymous.
Given these differences in subculture, the general consensus amongst those interviewed
was that there were definitively functional silos at the time. The "not invented here syndrome"
was prevalent within all the wireless development organizations at the time. Everyone had their
own opinion on how things should be done. If there were two product groups trying to do the
same thing, you needed a neutral broker to facilitate the requirements definition.
Adding to this was the unique culture of the UMTS team which needed to be
accommodated for. Having evolved out of the Matra GSM organization, they were a new entity
who needed to establish their "place at the table " within the technology community.
As each stakeholder group wanted to be well represented, they provided the top technical
resources out of their respective development organizations.
"The UMTS team knew they had a well defined problem. The two representatives from
UMTS were excellent to work with. They were very interested in learning everything they could
about CDMA. The representatives that were from both CDMA and UMTS were very cleaver and
worked together very well." -- WTL Feature Review Prime.
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The concept of shared development and ultimately the transfer design authority to a third
party were contrary to the culture within either the CDMA or UMTS development organizations
at the time. With the formation of the team, a new subculture emerged. This subculture was not
aligned with any particular site or line of business but was more influenced by the individual
team members many of whom had never previously worked together.
"It was clear from the start to all of us that we had to work together. -WTL Feature
Review Prime.
Another subculture within the development community is that of the "tribal elder ", a
certain engineer, who has earned the respect of his/her, peers and consequently holds unusual
influence over technical decisions. These individuals are typically considered the "cleverest or
most influential engineers by their peers " and can typically get things done outside of normal
channels or processes by simply asking nicely. The incident is described below.
"One of the designers from the old TDMA radio group asked us to implement an I/Q
imbalance functional block out of the blue withoutjustification. And we did! This was unusual
as the block was never used. There seemed to be some people within the organization for whom
the rules didn't strictly apply." -CDMA Design Prime.
To a large extent, the culture which emerged within the Rx ASIC development team was
highly congruent to meeting the commonality objective of the project. Some key cultural
attributes of this team were the following; each team member was technically competent and
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willing to share what they knew with the others on the team as well as willing to learn from the
others. There was a culture of fairness and rationality within the decision making process as
each developer worked toward the same goal. Each team member checked the others work
hence taking responsibility for the whole project not just one piece of it.
4.1.2 Rx ASIC Design Structure Matrix Analysis
The Design Structure Matrix (DSM) given in Figure 19 represents the coupling of
development tasks within the ASIC development process and the TTM development process
described in section 1.3.4 of this paper. The entries within the matrix provide the coupling of
information flow between tasks. Entry ( i, j ) represents task i as needing input from task j prior
to proceeding. The rows therefore show information flow into tasks whereas the columns show
information flow out of tasks. As the rows and columns represent the same tasks, a coupling
matrix of information flow is established.5 0 There are two types of information flow used within
the DSM. Entries within the matrix, signified with the number 1, indicate information which is
only available when the task generating that information (column task) is complete. Entries
within the matrix, signified with the number 2, indicate information which is available prior to
the task generating that information (column task) being complete.
There are two coupled blocks identified within the DSM. The first block "Block 1"
corresponds with the requirements definition phase where there is coupling between activities
leading to the approval of the ASIC design specification (DS - DSM Task 3). The second block
"Block 2", represents the coupling of internal tasks associated specifically with the development
50 DSM User's Guide for DSM@MIT, Soo-Haeng Cho, http://dsmweb.org/
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of the ASIC (Code Inspection and Simulation Review - DSM Task 15) and tasks associated with
the verification of the next higher level of integration containing the ASIC namely the DTRx
board, Radio and BTS (System Integrated - DSM Task 31).
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Figure 19 - Multi-Standard Rx Channelizer ASIC Task Based DSM
The major tasks within the ASIC development process are given in Table 4. Estimates of
effort and duration of each step are also given with respect to a no commonality strategy between
the UMTS and CDMA businesses. Due to the lack of additional data from this time period,
exact durations cannot be confirmed. However, the last program status update indicates a close
correlation to the estimates given above. Unexpected delays occurred during the Commit to
Layout phase due to issues relating to clock skew, insertion delay, and I/O timing issues. As the
i
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layout activity is strictly contained within the ASIC development process, there is little evidence
to indicate that these delays were impacted by commonality.
Process Step Description Relative 
to no commonality
Effort Duration
Project Plan In this case this was a multiple month effort 1.5x 3x
aligning the two businesses.
ASIC Specification The ASIC specification (DS) needs to take into
Approval account higher level system attributes both the 2x 2x
CDMA and UMTS standards.
Vendor Selection Vendor selection is based on the technology lx lx
used and is partially dependant on the DS.
Commit to Design Resources allocated and detailed design begins 1.5x 1.5x
Code Inspection & First review after completion of simulations. 2x lxSimulation Review
Commit to Layout Physical ASIC layout begins determining the Ix lx
size of the die.
Code Inspection & Second simulation after completion of ASIC 2x IxSimulation Review layout.
Commit to Prototype Commit to first prototype to be used in ASIC, lx lx
Review Board, Module and System verification.
Designer Test Review Final review of verification data from all levels 2x lx
(ASIC) of system integration
Commit to Volume Decision to proceed into volume production. 2x lx
Estimated Total Impact: 1.25 1.3
Table 4 - Rx ASIC Development Process Steps
The second major delay occurred due to commonality as the UMTS system software was
not available to confirm the final ASIC design, hence postponing tasks 28 and 31 (Module
Integration and System Integration) of coupled Block 2 shown in Figure 19. The impacts of the
UMTS system software availability impacted both the ASIC development as well as the CDMA
5 The estimated total impact of commonality on the ASIC development program is based on a weighted average of
each activity
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business as they were also depending on the ASIC for their projects. The delay of the system
software for UMTS was also a leading contributor to the abandonment of commonality on the
DTRx card discussed next.
4.2 Digital Transmit Receive Circuit Card (DTRx)
The Digital Transmit Receive (DTRx) circuit card performs digital signal processing of
UMTS and CDMA 3G signals. The card can provide processing for three 2G channels or one
3G channel.
In the forward link 2, the DTRx card receives digital base band data. It performs digital
signal processing (DSP) via the on board Tx channelizer ASIC applying pulse shaping, rate
conversion, peak limiting, interpolation, frequency shifting, channel combining and other signal
conditioning and processing algorithms to the digital base band data. The post processed digital
data is then transmitted to a digital to analog converter (DAC) on the transmit receive (TRx)
radio card for subsequent up conversion and RF transmission to the mobile user52 .
The DTRx is a printed circuit card assembly found inside the CDMA and UMTS transmit
receive module (TRM) commonly referred to as the radio. The assembly is located at the fourth
level of product hierarchy shown in Figure 15. A functional block representation of the DTRx
printed circuit card assembly showing the RF/IF and digital signal paths is given in Figure 21 and
Figure 22 for reference.
52 forward link refers to signals generated at the BTS and transmitted to the mobile users, reverse link refers to
signals generated by the mobile user and subsequently transmitted to the BTS
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Physically, the part is realized as an industry standard glass epoxy (FR-4) multilayer
printed circuit card shown for reference in Figure 20.
Figure 20 - DTRx Printed Circuit Card Assembly (FR-4) Physical Realization
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Figure 22 - DTRx Functional Block Diagram
The development of the DTRx card took place at the same time as the development of the
Rx ASIC, Tx ASIC and high speed serializer (HSSPC-II) ASIC. As mentioned in the previous
three lenses analyses, there are two Rx ASICs, two Tx ASICs and two HSSL ASICs per DTRx
card making the ASIC designs and the DTRx design very interdependent of each other. Due to
the shortage of hardware development resources within the UMTS business, the WTL
development organization was solicited to support the design of a UMTS DTRx card.
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Given that the WTL team was involved in both the ASIC development and the DTRx
card development, all of the external and internal DTRx interfaces were under the control of a
single group. This was particularly important with respect to the high speed serial link (HSSL)
interfaces as their implementations were different between the UMTS and CDMA BTSs.
Concurrently, the CDMA organization was also planning to design a CDMA DTRx card
specifically for use on their next generation multi carrier radio which was to take advantage of
the new channelizer ASICs.
Both the UMTS and CDMA development organizations had the same Vice President at
the time, who stated that he wanted to achieve commonality between UMTS and CDMA BTS at
the highest level. With this mandate, the CDMA hardware development team joined efforts with
the WTL hardware development team to develop a common DTRx card.
"My manager was given a mandate to participate in making the DTRx card common for
both UMTS and CDMA. Once I was asked, I participated actively in setting the commonality
architecture given the mandate to do so from above. "53 - CDMA Design Prime
It was not clear at this juncture that any other considerations regarding the impacts of this
commonality strategy had been assessed. The other stakeholders namely PLM, Operations and
the Software development groups were not actively involved in making the decision. However,
1 January 22, 1999 Nortel Networks organizational announcement, VP of Wireless Mobility Development, assumes
responsibility for global Mobility R&D Strategy. He will work with GMs to prioritize R&D projects across Mobility,
with a focus on commonality
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circumstantial evidence indicates that there was an apparent short term benefit to both PLM and
software groups.
"PLM was originally very supportive of the collaborative effort as it gave them access to
early prototypes which could be usedfor software development. Once the early prototypes had
been completed, PLM became less supportive of a common DTRx card and began to focus more
on the cost of the card." -WTL Functional Manager
The following is three lens analysis of the DTRx development project focusing on the
implications of the commonality strategy chosen on product development lead time.
4.2.1 The Three Lenses
The Strategic Lens
The idea of designing a common DTRx card servicing both the UMTS and CDMA
businesses was primarily borne out of the development organizations in 1999 in an effort to meet
time to market pressures and improve design efficiency. The drive toward commonality between
UMTS and CDMA had been stated as an organizational objective by the Vice President of
UMTS/CDMA BTS development.
"The two businesses had a single VP who wanted commonality at the highest level in
order to reduce cost, improve time to market and make ongoing support easier."- CDMA
Design Prime.
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Because the WTL organization was working on the Rx Channelizer ASIC, it was known
within the WTL organization that it wouldn't be a big stretch technically to share a common
digital card between CDMA and UMTS. Initially, the WTL organization focused on providing
preliminary technical feasibility, design estimates and cost estimates to the CDMA and UMTS
businesses. The development organizations agreed with the recommendation to proceed with a
joint development program on the DTRx card as it provided a means to leverage WTL design
resources consequently freeing up critical work on the UMTS and CDMA hardware design
teams. Both hardware development organizations were also motivated to participate as it was
generally felt that it would be cheaper to do the development this way and it would provide the
greatest value to the company. It also linked well with their high level functional objective
which was to achieve higher levels of commonality between the two product lines.
"The director of CDMA hardware development was told to make it work."- CDMA
Design Prime.
The software development organizations within each business were not linked into the
strategy as the firmware and higher level software had always meant to be different leaving only
the hardware to be common. It is not clear why this decision was made but this lack of linkage
with the stated objectives proved to be a crucial juncture in the future evolution of the DTRx
card.
CDMA/UMTS PLM organizations were also in agreement to proceed, although, a
common development program was not viewed as ideal by either organization. Initially, it was
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felt that the major benefit of a common development program was to provide early prototypes
more quickly. The CDMA PLM team already had a design started, so this was a bit of a bother
to them, but they were willing to do multiple hardware spins, driven primarily by their software
schedule. The UMTS PLM team, on the other hand, was faced with resource constraints within
their hardware development team leaving them with few other options.
The Operations organization was not involved in setting the original commonality
strategy although ultimately beneficiaries of it. Once engaged, they quickly became advocates
for it but this indicates a poor linking between the commonality objective and the interests of a
significant stakeholder during the early phases of the project.
Of the three top business metrics at the time, namely time to market (TTM), time to cost
(TTC) and time to quality (TTQ), the common DTRx development project was most heavily
aligned to TTM. Commonality was viewed as a way of achieving rapid time to market in
particular by the UMTS business. It was also thought that the higher combined volume between
the UMTS and CDMA portfolios would ultimately help drive a lower overall product cost, with
UMTS primarily taking advantage of the much higher CDMA volumes initially.
The senior managers from the CDMA and UMTS radio design teams were involved
providing the technical interface requirements and overall performance specifications for the
common DTRx card. Furthermore, the functional managers provided final authority on all
technical decisions along with the high level architects from each business who ultimately
approved the overall architecture of the board after performing cost and functionality tradeoffs.
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The technical teams for both CDMA and WTL (representing UMTS) worked closely
together and were located in the same building in Ottawa. The work on the single card was split
into blocks. It was then partitioned further into functional blocks. The partitioning of the
functional blocks between design primes is given in Figure 23.
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ProcssorandTx ChannelizerProcessor and Circuits 
- g
yHigh Speed
Senal Link Block
Rx Channelizer .
Circuits
Reset Circuit -b. Clock Circuits
Block
WTL Design Prime - Representing UMTS
I I CDMA Design Prime
Figure 23 - DTRx Functional Block Development Partitions
At the hardware design level, the UMTS and CDMA design primes created a single
Design Specification (DS), schematic and physical layout. Both developers worked from the
same single set of design files. Between the two developers, each would check the others work
to ensure that their own requirements were being met in the functional block being designed by
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the other. They were trying to include the other groups' requirements as they designed their
assigned functional block using a peer review as the final check and ratification cycle.
According to the developers, the fact that two requirements were folded into one design
made the work slightly more complex. Schematics were harder to read due to redundancy.
Layouts had to ensure both requirements were met making the design harder to comprehend.
The timing analysis done had to be robust enough to work for both applications using the non
optimized design caused by commonality. All of these factors have a negative impact on product
development lead time and consequently TTM. Also, there are indications that a number of
external groups impacted by the commonality strategy on the DTRx card were grossly
underestimated. This was compounded by the lack of a formal process to facilitate decision
making at the working level when technical differences of opinion came to light. The quote
below is a good indication of this.
"Ifocused on defining the external interfaces. First, this included making sure all
external cables and connectors would be used I had to interface into approximately 20
designers at various levels (mechanicals from both CDMA and UMTS, WTL and even the CDMA
radio architect). Everyone had an opinion; it was not very structured for the requirements
gathering. It turned out to be a very ad hoc proposal of interfaces." -- CDMA Design Prime.
The product development phase most impacted by the commonality strategy chosen was
the requirements gathering phase. The artwork layout phase also took longer according to
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estimates from the hardware designers. Although, the total effort was less than twice which is
what would be expected if two separate cards had been developed.
The software for UMTS/CDMA was quite different from the base level up. The CDMA
software was developed in Ottawa and the UMTS software was developed in Paris. This added
complexity was exasperated by the fact that the UMTS software group would not support the
designer verification test (DVT), software needs of the WTL organization or the Test
Engineering organization that instead had to rely on the CDMA software team for their DVT
software needs. From a commonality perspective, piggy backing test software off a common
hardware design turned out to be a beneficial time saving effort. However, additional effort was
required to convince the CDMA software team to provide software which would enable testing
of unique UMTS functions, something clearly outside of their immediate mandate. At a high
level, the program seemed to be structured around the commonality goal but at the working level,
it required tremendous effort. Contributing to the increased work load, were the separate
software streams which inevitably led to schedule differences between the two businesses.
Because of these schedule differences, DVT and regulatory test cycles were disjoint between
CDMA and UMTS adding further complexity to the program with respect to maintaining
commonality.
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Figure 24 - DTRx Program Structure (Reciprocal, Pooled & Sequential Task Interdependence) 54
The grouping of activities and the program structure are shown in Figure 24. The
diagram shows activity groupings which have pooled, sequential and reciprocal
interdependencies, further confounding the efforts to maintain commonality. At this level of
assembly, this increased complexity can be explained by the necessity to involve an increased
number of external groups involved in the product development process. In particular, the
complexities of involving external software development teams and test engineering are evident.
In addition, to the above, is the complexity of a multi-site development environment. As
with the Rx ASIC team language differences between Ottawa and Paris, were not considered a
significant issue. In fact, there was a preference expressed for working across different time
zones as long as immediate information wasn't required. The fact that there were 'fewer
54 James Thompson, 1967, introduced a topology of task interdependence - reciprocal, sequential and pooled.
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interruptions " was considered positive as more work was getting done. However, during
periods when real time support was required, the multi-site development environment was
viewed as cumbersome.
"During hardware integration it became very difficult, duplicate issues popping up
simultaneously in multiple locations all requiring real time support."- CDMA & UMTS Design
Primes.
Churn requests were handled directly by the individual designing the impacted functional
block. Conflicts were escalated to the UMTS and CDMA businesses independently through the
functional management organizations, resolution and consensus was based on the two sides
calling each other. There was no single person assigned to facilitate conflict. It was strictly
based on a best efforts basis.
As an example, the UMTS group wanted to use a Utopia bus which was not standard to
CDMA. In order to implement this efficiently, the UMTS organization felt that the brand new
Motorola 8260 microprocessor, with the functionality for a Utopia interface already built in, was
required. This slowed the project down significantly as only engineering samples of the 8260
were available. These microprocessors had bugs and were a new platform on which the
hardware and software developers had little to no experience. Alternately, the CDMA group did
not need this higher end processor and could have achieved the required functionality using the
Motorola 860 processor (which was slower, cheaper and generally available) and had already
been used on the previous generation of CDMA radio.
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"Supporting two sets offunctionality on one board dramatically increases complexity". -
CDMA Design Prime.
Strategically, the initiative was poorly aligned with the TTM, TTC and TTQ metrics of
both lines of business. The activities of each stakeholder were not closely linked resulting in
additional and unnecessary task complexity. The grouping of activities was also incongruent
with the desired output of a common DTRx card, separate software teams, schedules, DVT and
PI cycles. All contributed to the ultimate abandonment of the commonality strategy toward the
end of the product development cycle.
The Political Lens
In all, there were seven primary stakeholders involved in the development of the common
DTRx card. At the highest level, these can be grouped into the WTL hardware development
team (representing UMTS), CDMA hardware development team, UMTS software development
team, CDMA software development team, CDMA PLM team, UMTS PLM team and Operations.
The functional mandates of each of these groups as well as their roles and responsibilities are
given in Section 1.3.4 of this paper. At the time of this project, the CDMA business was under
tremendous pressure to develop 3G capability within their portfolio and the UMTS business was
under tremendous pressure to introduce a new 3G platform.
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Resource constraints, within the UMTS hardware development organization, as well as a
high level commonality mandate were the underlying reasons for a joint development program
on the DTRx card.
A sighted benefit was the belief that a common development effort would yield earlier
prototypes which could be used for software development. Software development was viewed as
the longest lead item in the push for 3G capability and as such was treated as the critical path by
the PLM organization.
Even with a joint development effort, the UMTS development team was forced to solicit
help from the external WTL organization which was neither for or against the effort but felt it
aligned well with their capabilities. In retrospect, it appeared to be a "marriage of convenience"
primarily driven by the need of the UMTS business for early DTRx prototypes.
It appears that the net zero-sum, "pie " was altered in favor of the UMTS business to the
detriment of the CDMA business in the short term. The decision to proceed could be viewed as
irrational5 5 by the CDMA business. At the working level, the WTL hardware developer
representing the UMTS business was given schedule, cost and quality targets to meet. On the
other hand, the CDMA hardware developer was given the mandate to just make it work for both
product families.
5 Irrational in this context refers to decisions made which do not optimize ones own position.
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"There were no constraints placed on the project. The mandate was for it to be common.
Interfaces although different to each of the Power Amplifiers had to be worked out."- CDMA
Design Prime
Once the program kickoff occurred, the hardware developers strictly focused on the
execution of the technical aspects of their work. As the UMTS requirements were viewed as
more stringent, additional channelizers were added; a more powerful micro processor was used
(8260) and the board became more complex than it would have been given a CDMA only
solution. Also, the UMTS integration proved to be more difficult. Ultimately, the additional
UMTS objectives were met at the expense of CDMA business. Some minor advantages in
efficiency were gained by the UMTS business through the doubling up of testing effort with the
CDMA business.
Up until the customer ready (CuR) milestone, both PLM organizations were primarily
concerned with time to market. Any delays caused by the additional complexity of a common
development program were masked by the delivery of the Rx channelizers which ultimately,
from a hardware perspective, became the gating items for both UMTS and CDMA. Also, large
differences in schedule between the UMTS business and the CDMA business evolved. The
DTRx went through P1 testing for CDMA long before it went through it for UMTS. At this point,
the CDMA business took over the schedule lead. Furthermore, the high level UMTS BTS
development program was being gated by software problems as well as problems with other
modules. To compound the issue, the pickup of UMTS technology in the market place suddenly
stalled, reducing the focus on time to market within the UMTS business. The divergence at the
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card level occurred very late in the design process (CuR) with the 1W4 common artwork of the
DTRx card becoming the specific ODI artwork for CDMA.
The commonality strategy was quickly abandoned as inequity in business needs became
evident. Both teams wanted to isolate themselves from the other teams churn and reduce the
management effort required to keep things common. Product cost was sited as the main driver
for the spilt. However, two stock lists had always been planned for use in order to optimize the
product cost for each business.
Once the commonality strategy had been abandoned formally, the CDMA line of
business quickly set about optimizing product cost and rapidly bringing the product to market.
Also, the structure of the development organization changed from that shown in Figure 3 to that
shown in Figure 4. CDMA and UMTS BTS development was no longer consolidated under one
Vice President. Instead, it was split into two groups each reporting into their respective lines of
business further weakening the mandate for commonality between the two products.
In summary, when viewing power "as the ability to get things done, one can better
visualize the character ofpower as aforce that is both constraining and producing" 6 The
development organization was the primary benefactors of the commonality as it allowed them to
pool resources and meet their commitments to both the CDMA and UMTS businesses. This was
primarily done through the control of key technical resources as well as the overall management
of the product development process. Typical programs of this nature within Nortel Networks
56 Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen and Westney, 1999, "Organizational Behavior & Processes",
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, South-Western College Publishing, Boston MA, ISBN 0-538-87546-1
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would have had an independent, integrated project team leader (IPTL) managing execution of all
deliverables. As the CDMA PLM organization was primarily concerned with time to market, it
was faced with accepting the commonality strategy as a means of getting prototypes more
quickly. This turned out not to be the case as the Rx ASIC development program ultimately
became the gating item with respect to hardware development for the CDMA business. The
UMTS PLM organization had no other options as they did not have adequate development
resources within their business. The Operations organization, whom ultimately would have
benefited the greatest from a common DTRx, had little formal input or influence into the
decision to have a common DTRx card or the subsequent decision to abandon that strategy.
"I influenced the team to get a product which could be tested on a common test
bed/fixture with common software. This helped me out greatly in meeting TTM. I tried very
hard to convince the team to keep the product common but I didn't succeed At CuR the PCB
was actually still quite common. It was a cost reduction program that completely killed it." -
Operations Test Engineer.
As the organizational structure shifted and the individual business needs became more
clearly defined, an observed shift in the balance of power was observed transitioning from the
functional organization to the individual businesses.
The Cultural Lens
As mentioned in the Cultural Lens analysis of the Multi-Standard Receive Channelizer
ASIC, the significant change in Nortel Networks corporate culture came in 1997 with the Right
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Hand Turn initiative headed by John Roth. As this has already been previously discussed in
great detail, this analysis will focus primarily on the cultural aspects of the organization as it
pertained to the development of a common DTRx card.
The TTM culture introduced by John Roth in 1997 dominated the whole project. The
culture within the wireless business was described as;
"Very aggressive compared to the digital switching culture within Nortel Networks.
Aggressive schedules are a key cultural component (TTM of the wireless business."-Anonymous
Although the general sense was of speed and effectiveness, new employees to the
organization found the culture chaotic.
"I didn't understand the culture. As an outsider, it seemed as if each department worked
in their own way. It appeared as things were happening quickly but it was actually very slow. It
felt chaotic because I had to learn a lot of new things very quickly." - Operations prime
Each of the groups within the team, had unique subcultures which provided insight into
the organization at the time. As mentioned in the multi-standard Rx channelizer ASIC analysis
earlier, the UMTS team in France was considered more conservative and more apt to take time to
thoroughly analyze data before making a decision. Also, the UMTS organization was described
as ASIC centric rather than board centric giving the impression that they were only reluctantly
involved in designing the DTRx card. The teams in Ottawa appeared to be more aggressive and
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apt to take risks for the purpose of accelerating schedule. The WTL hardware development
organization was seen as being more interested in technically elegant rather than robust circuit
implementations. Manufacturability and reliability were not seen as guiding principles in their
decision making process. The CDMA hardware development organization was viewed as
pragmatic, typically choosing the more conservative and robust circuit implementations.
Between all of the groups, they appeared to have an excellent working relationship
understanding and complimenting each others attributes. However, the organization above the
working level was viewed as lacking communication between businesses with disjoint priorities
and not being aligned to the commonality strategy chosen.
To a large extent, the culture which emerged within the DTRx development team was
one of individual effort and persistence. Some key cultural attributes of this team were the
following: Each team member worked well with the others, issues had to get worked out as there
was no real mechanism for simple conflict resolution and each team member checked the others
work taking responsibility for the whole project. There was also an underlying sense of pride
that a quality product had been developed in such challenging circumstances and under such
schedule duress. This cultural attribute was present in each individual interviewed and appears
to be pivotal in the temporary success of making the DTRx card common to CDMA and UMTS.
4.2.2 Design Structure Matrix
There were two simulations performed on the DTRx card development. The first DSM,
(DSM 1) reflects the common UMTS/CDMA DTRx card previously discussed in this paper and
is shown in Figure 25 in its "as early as possible" (AEAP) analyzed form. The second DSM
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(DSM 2) reflects a hypothetical development program in which only a CDMA DTRx is
developed and is shown in Figure 26 in its "as early as possible " (AEAP) analyzed form. The
DSM is structured around the information flow outlined in the Nortel Networks PCB57 design
process. The basic PCB development is designed to be iterative as described in Table 5. The
durations used in the simulation are based on estimates provided by the developers involved in
the project. The estimates provided were normalized in order to protect the proprietary nature of
this information. The "Detailed Design - Block 2" reflects the tight coupling of activities during
the detailed design phase between the two developers. The dependency between functional
blocks and hardware developers is shown Figure 23. The coupling between the DTRx card and
the Rx ASIC previously discussed is not included in the analysis. The DSM entries use the same
nomenclature as those used for the Rx ASIC DSM given in Section 4.1.2.
There are three coupled blocks identified within each of the two DSMs. The first block
"Definition -Block 1" corresponds with the requirements definition phase where there is
coupling between activities leading to the approval of the DTRx design specification (DSM 1 -
Task 5 and DSM 2 - Task 3). The second block "Detailed Design - Block 2" represents the
coupling of internal tasks associated specifically with the development of the DTRx (DSM 1
Task 8 - 17 and DSM 2 Task 6 - 15). The third and final block "Verification - Block 3" reflects
the close coupling of tasks associated with the five levels of verification employed. Of particular
note, is the difference in coupling between the designer test (DT) stage and the functional
agreement (FA) stage of the design process. This can be understood as failures are expected to
occur during the DT stage and iterations are expected and consequently planned for.
57 source Nortel Networks - CDMA PCP development process 2000.
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Alternatively, unexpected feedback from the later stages of product verification, namely, module,
system, node and network levels only feed back to the layout phase of the FA stage.
The impact of strictly maintaining the commonality strategy as modeled in DSM 1
assumes that there are no material or human resource constraints such as software availability.
As we are primarily concerned with the implications of commonality on product development
lead times, this is appropriate. However, it is important to note that the joint development of a
UMTS/CDMA DTRx was abandoned shortly after the completion of design verification testing
for the CDMA variant ( DSM 1 - Block 3). There were two primary reasons given for this at the
time. The first reason was TTM, as UMTS system software was not available at the start of the
verification cycle, verification could not begin on the UMTS DTRx variant. The second reason
was TTC. There were significant material cost implications to the CDMA DTRx variant directly
due to the additional functionality required to support commonality.
"This can also be caused by unexpected market changes or technology innovation in the
middle ofprocesses. The unplanned iteration is often regarded as afailure mode and requires
managerial decision about whether to continue or abandon the project. s5
58 Author of Users Guide for DSM@MIT describing the impacts of an unplanned iteration
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Communication
Process Step Description
Input Output
Project Approval In this case this was a multiple month effort Plan Funding
aligning the two businesses.
Design Review (DR) Cross functional development team review of the
Design Specification (DS) includes systems and DS Updated DS
software groups.
Design Inspection (DI) Cross functional development team design review Updated
of circuit schematics (CS) and circuit analysis CS, ANA CS ANA(ANA). At completion a key items list (KIL) and
manufacturing stock list (MSL) are generated. KIL/MSL
Functional Agreement Cross functional review with manufacturing on Updated
(FA) PCP specific features (SF), common features (CF), SF CF,
component rationalization and optimization report SF, CF, CROP, 'O,(CROP), KIL and MSL. A design for KIL/MSL KIL/MSL
manufacturability (DFM) report is generated as an
output. DFM
Component Placement Mechanical review prior to final layout and SF, CF, ANA Updated
Agreement component placement. Includes validation of and Initial SF, CF and
(CPA) DFM implementation and analysis review. Layout Layout Files
Physical Agreement Final review prior to build. SF, CF, Layout Updated
(PA) Files, ANA and Layout Files
FA milestone and build
minutes EC
Build EC Prototype Build Prototypes
Designer Test (DVT) Design verification test using agreed to Prototype VR
verification plan (VP). Outcome is a verification re-design if
report (VR). VP re-d
required
Design Close Final project close including update of all Updated
(DC) documentation and release to production. data set final dataset.
Table 5 - DTRx PCB Design Process Steps 59
59 See Appendix 1 for details of how this process was implemented into the DSM model.
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The results of the DSM analysis indicate approximately 28% difference between the
coupled UMTS/CDMA development program and the fully autonomous hypothetical CDMA
development program. A T-Test of the resulting data indicates a significant statistical difference
between the two cases with > 99% confidence interval. A comparison of for each coupled block
and complete estimated program duration is given in Table 6.
Table 6 - Simulated Product Development Lead Times for DTRx
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UMTS / CDMA Lead Times 60  CDMA Only Lead Times60
Block Name
Fastest Average Slowest Fastest Average Slowest
Block I - Definition .5 .7 .8 .4 .5 .6
Block 2 - Detailed Design 73.7 92.2 113.1 50.3 64.1 81.1
Block 3 - Verification 66.7 78.5 89.3 51.9 62.2 70.8
i = 173.8, s = 17.5 p = 113.1, s = 11.9
Total Program Duration Confidence Intervals: Confidence Intervals:
(10%,30%,50%,70%,90%)= (156.6, (10%,30%,50%,70%,90%) = (100,
168.7, 175.1, 182, 193.5) 109, 114, 119, 156)
60 Normalized lead time units
IUMTS/CDMA DTRx Card Development
100 1
90 0.9
80 0.8
70 0.7
60 0 m
S50 0.5
40 0.4
0E
30 0.3 E
20 0.2
10 0.1
0 0
62.7 71.4 80.0 88.7 96.4 107.7 118.9 130.1 141.4 152.6 163.8 175.1 186.3 197.5
Lead Time
(without Resource Constraints)
Figure 27 - Simulated Development Lead Time UMTS/CDMA DTRx
DTRx CDMA Onh,
90 1
80 0.9
70 0.8
0.6 7S60 0
S50
0.5
20
30 E0.30
20 0.2
10 0.1
0 0.1
62.7 71.4 80.0 88.7 97.4 106.1 114.8 123.4 132.1 140.8 148.1 159.3 170.6 181.8 193.0 204.3
Lead Time
(without Resource Constraints)
Figure 28 - Simulated Development Lead Time CDMA Only DTRx
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4.3 The Common Radio Module (CRM)
The Common Radio Module (CRM) contains all of the functionality of the Rx ASIC and
DTRx card previously described in sections 4.10. The additional functionality, contained within
this module, pertain primarily to analog RF signal conditioning including amplification,
frequency conversion, attenuation, filtering and RF output power monitoring and adjustment
associated with the air interface of a CDMA BTS.
In the reverse link, the RF signal from the mobile is received at the BTS antenna and
routed to the Rx input of the CRM. The signal is then filtered, amplified and down converted
from radio frequency (RF) to intermediate frequency (IF), transformed into a digital signal via an
ADC and passed through DSP circuitry similar to that previously described for the DTRx card.
The CRM is a field replaceable unit (FRU) which can be installed on the BTS at the
factory or ordered separately for subsequent capacity expansion in the field. The assembly is
located at the first level of product hierarchy shown in Figure 13 for reference. A functional
block representation of the CRM showing major internal assemblies is given in Figure 29.
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Figure 29 - CRM Functional Block Diagram
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Physically, the part is realized as the mechanical assembly shown in Figure 30.
Figure 30 - CRM Physical Realization
The development of the CRM began just after the telecommunications bubble burst in
2001. The module contains the previously mentioned multi standard channelizer ASICs. The
module was required to be backward compatible with the existing CDMA product portfolio and
therefore shared mechanicals with the existing power amplifier module. Electrical interfaces
were previously defined by the DTRx card which is located within the existing multiple carrier
transmit receive module6' (MTRM). Also, the RF performance and call processing performance
of the CRM had to be at least as good as or better than the current radio product. The TTM
product development process outlined in section 1.3.4 of this thesis was used during the
development of the CRM.
61 The DTRx card is located inside the MTRM module and defines many of the external electrical interfaces of the
system.
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The program was initiated by the CDMA hardware development organization as a means
of improving product cost through the elimination of non-integrated OEM assemblies within the
existing radio portfolio. It was felt that by integrating functionality material, handling and
manufacturing costs could be reduced. Expected ancillary benefits were improved reliability,
performance and a reduction in return rates.
4.3.1 Three Lenses
The Strategic Lens
The CRM is a customer orderable item, often referred to as a field replaceable unit (FRU)
within the industry. As such, the product must be introduced using the TTM process given in
Section 1.3.4. In all, there were three TTM teams developing six CRM variants during the time
of this study. Each TTM team operated autonomously but when required used "partnership
agreements " to manage program interdependencies.
TTM Program Development Frequency Variants MHz Mechanical Variants
Team Location
CRM Calgary 800, 1900 Metro Cell, international
cBTS Calgary 800, 1900 Radio Module
Market Capture Ottawa 450, 2100 Metro Cell
Table 7 -CRM Programmatic Interdependencies
Within the CRM TTM core team, there were four functional stakeholders, representing
Development, Operations, Service Introduction and Product Line Management. The role of the
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New Product Program Manager and the Core Team Leader was to ensure that the program
delivered against its commitments to the business.
The commonality strategy for the CRM was originated by the senior management of the
development organization.
"We were trying to leverage multiple applications off of a common artwork, primarily to
meet Time to Market criteria with our limited resources." - Senior Development Manager.
The lead architects and functional managers within the development organization set
strategies for PCB commonality across all applications and platforms as well as frequencies.
This was the result of multiple discussions with the detail hardware designers who were
responsible for the physical implementation of the commonality strategy. Once the strategy had
been set, it became very difficult for other stakeholders to influence or change it.
"I did not set the strategy I was strictly managing the design deliverables into the
program manager. When I joined just after BR 62 and all the plans and commitments had already
been set." - CRM core team Product Development Manager.
By design, the TTM core team is highly cross functional in nature. Each core team
representative works with their broader functional organization to ensure project deliverables are
met. However, even with the cross functional representation, the implications of the
62 BR - TTM process terminology for Business Ready - Business Decision Point see Figure 6 - Phases of TTM
Product Development Process
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commonality strategy to the program was not well understood by the core team. It was also
apparent, that the implications of commonality with respect to higher levels of assembly weren't
fully appreciated within the Development organization. This resulted in module and system
level configurations which weren't able to cope with the coupling of multiple common variants
at the early stages of the program.
At a high level, the strategy was communicated to all stakeholders. The strategy was also
documented within the development schedules, engineering changes, and verification plans all
indicating a high degree of design re use. Most of the work fell onto the radio card hardware
design groups. They had to intertwine schedules between frequency variants. The Product
Development Manager (PDM) had to take detailed schedules and work them into the higher level
program plans. The software was structured in order to take advantage of the common portions
of the hardware through modularization.
The core team had to stage the overall high level plan in order to manage the extra
schedule complexity required to achieve commonality. This added directly to project
management overhead. Operations had to set up product codes and overall infrastructure to
support commonality.
In order to maintain commonality at the working level, a single board prime was made
responsible for both the 800 MHz and 1900 MHz radio card variants.
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"I was the detailed designer who was trying to implement the stated commonality
objective, namely, to design four boards on one layout." Is' CRM radio card development
prime.
The requirements for both 800MHz and 1900MHz were defined in parallel before any
detailed design began. This included the frequency block design and level analysis which were
completed but not implemented until later in the program. The roles and responsibilities of the
designers also changed. Each designer was now responsible for delivering functional blocks for
both 800MHz and 1900MHz variants. In effect, each engineer owned a piece of the
commonality requirement.
Co-location was also another key measure in maintaining commonality. By focusing all
the development work, into one group, in one location, effectively ensured commonality at the
PCB level. When a second development team was engaged to work on the 450MHz variant, the
AW diverged. One explanation for this is the fact that the 800MHz and 1900MHz were in the
midst of significant design churn at the time and it was more expeditious to decouple the AW.
"There was afoundational data set which all other design groups were supposed to use
as a basis for their work. However, discipline required to maintain the foundational data set
wasn't maintained as the various design groups found they lost their flexibility. This behavior
was primarily driven by the fact that project needs weren't being met."- CRM core team Supply
Chain Operations.
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Other organizations, such as test engineering, were also organized around commonality; a
single owner for radios and for PA's. However, a significant issue in the grouping and linking of
activities was the use of three distinct TTM core teams. The cBTS and 450MHz and CRM
programs all had conflicting priorities. Based on findings from a lessons learned session, it was
found that the core team leaders didn't relate to each others problems even though they were the
same.
"I don't think there was any linkage at all. If I was attending a cBTS meeting, nobody
cared about CRM Ifelt that I was the only person in the room who seemed to care or know
about other product variants. We imposed linkage at the working level as we were the only ones
who could see it."- Test Engineer.
CDMA H/W
. Common Data Set ----------- Development
Group 2
Supply Chain Product
Ol ations Develo ent
450MHzTTM
Core Team
Partnership
Supply Chain Product Pdu Supply ChainOperations Deveopment --------- Deo pent Opertions
CDMA HW
L ----------------- ------------------- Development
Figure 31 - CRM Program Structure (Engineering) Showing Reciprocal Interdependence 63
63 James Thompson, 1967, introduced a topology of task interdependence - reciprocal, sequential and pooled.
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The grouping of engineering activities between the various programs simultaneously
using the CRM data set is given in Figure 31. The groupings indicate a high degree of reciprocal
interdependence. Feedback from the functional design managers indicates that the commonality
strategy was adhered to as much as possible. From their perspective, commonality was viewed
as an overriding objective, a means by which to achieve TTM for the program.
The original design plan was to use an iterative approach. It was felt that this would
reduce risk and protect the program schedule. The plan was to start with the 800MHz variant
first then use it as a basis for the 1900MHz design. Changes implemented during the
development of the 1900MHz were to be folded back into the 800MHz design hence maintaining
commonality. During this process, the development team struggled with implementing non
optimum solutions for the sake of maintaining commonality. Performance hits were accepted in
order to choose parts with a common footprint for both frequency variants. In certain cases, new
hybrid foot prints would be designed to accommodate special items such as the RF ceramic filter,
Tx modulator and the LNA hybrid. In many instances, these hybrid solutions never made it into
the final product. Radio board partitioning was also crucial, the development team was grouped
into specific functions such as digital, IF, Rx and Tx. The digital and IF sections were deemed to
be frequency agnostic and therefore most of the development effort focused on making the Rx
and Tx RF chains common between variants. However, the use of non optimum circuit
implementations for the Rx and Tx RF chains proved more challenging than expected.
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Although the original plan included two design iterations, commonality in conjunction
with requirements chum, significantly increased the complexity of the development activity and
consequently increased the product development lead time.
"Churning in changes during the CRM 1900MHz caused multiple delays. Also, the
introduction of the cBTS LNA caused a perfectly functional Rx chain to be modified We had to
squeeze the already tight design by 20% to make it fit. This really threw things off" - 1st CRM
radio card development prime.
Under normal circumstances, the commonality strategy would have been abandoned in
order to achieve TTM. In this instance, due to resource constraints within the development
organization, commonality was enforced through organizational structure and subsequently
negatively impacting TTM for the first variant.
There was no explicit or direct linkage between TTM, TTQ or TTC and the commonality
strategy. It was implicitly assumed to be beneficial. Shorter design cycles were planned based
on commonality assumptions but were never explicitly linked to the high level program metrics.
Strategically, grouping the radio development under one program would have
significantly helped align already tightly linked activities with the high level TTM, TTC and
TTQ metrics. The negative impact on TTM for the CRM program was offset by later gains in
TTM on the cBTS program.
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"The fact that we were going through layoffs at the time also helped as it reduced the
number of engineers working on the program. Even though the result looked quite structured, in
actuality, we lucked out." -2nd CRM radio card development prime.
The Political Lens
In all, there were four primary stakeholders involved in the development of the common
radio module (CRM). At the highest level, these can be grouped into the TTM core team leaders
(CRM, cBTS and 450 MHz/2100 MHz), PLM, Development and Operations. The functional
mandates of each of these groups, as well as their roles and responsibilities are given in Section
1.3.2 of this paper. At the time of this project, Nortel Networks was in a period of contraction.
All lines of business were faced with layoffs, salary freezes, cutbacks and general corporate wide
cost containment initiatives.
As mentioned earlier, the program was initiated by the CDMA hardware development
organization as a means of improving product cost through the elimination of non-integrated
OEM assemblies within the existing radio portfolio. It was felt that by integrating functionality
material, handling and manufacturing cost could be reduced. Expected ancillary benefits were
improved reliability, performance and a reduction in return rates.
The Development organization felt that they were in the best position to deliver the CRM
and proposed to do so out of a single location. The underlying reasons given to justify this
position vary, however, maintaining work within the organization was certainly a key factor.
The PLM organization was on the other hand strictly interested in value to the business and was
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weighing the benefits of funding an internal development effort vs. funding an existing original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) for the development effort.
The Development organization signed up to extremely tight time lines, very low product
cost targets and limited development costs. This ultimately swayed the PLM organization away
from pursuing an OEM solution for the CRM and funding for the internally developed CRM
began. The development organization had effectively singed up to schedule and cost targets
which could only be met through high degrees of commonality. Unfortunately, the assumption
that commonality at the lower level would not impact higher level integration, turned out to be
wrong.
Subsequent schedule pressure from the various core team leaders put constraints on the
degree of commonality that could be achieved. Unfortunately, the assumption that commonality
at the lower level would not impact higher level integration turned out to be wrong. The TTM
core team leaders viewed commonality as something the development organization wanted and
not something of direct benefit to them. Therefore, any perceived impact due to commonality on,
quality, cost or schedule resulted immediately in pressure to diverge. As programs progress
through the product development process, the importance of TTM, TTQ and TTC change.
Typically, TTM is the most important metric between the BR6 and CR business decision points.
The influence of TTM diminishes as TTQ becomes more dominant, typically between the CR
and ChR business decision points. Toward the end of a program, after the ChR business decision
point, TTC (product cost) typically dominates.
" Figure 6 - Phases of TTM Product Development Process
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Due to schedule and priority conflicts between the three top level programs, the
Development Organization had no choice but to diverge from their originally stated commonality
strategy. The strategy changed from a common artwork to separate artwork to once again
common artwork by the end of the program. Additional frequency variants were also added.
The commonality strategy changed to accommodate the triple constraints of all other projects.
The implications of the commonality strategy also impacted Operations who became a larger and
more influential stakeholder in programmatic decisions. This became particularly evident during
the implementation, deployment and life cycle phases. During the implementation phase the 450
MHz, 2100 MHz and cBTS requirements arose. Because of the commonality constraints, they
all had to be churned in together. During the deployment phase, the backward compatibility
between new variants and the common pieces of the old variants had to be taken into account
before deploying the new variants. Once deployed into production, the cost reduction cycle
started. This was hampered by the requirement that all variants had to be considered instead of
each individually. At the CR business decision point, the role of the Operations core team
representative changed from being a project manager to program manager and a layer was added
below them to manage the complexities of commonality.
It is apparent that the commonality strategy was not aligned with the priorities of the core
team leaders. However, the core team leaders quickly became aware of the implications and the
necessity of maintaining the commonality strategy and struck partnership agreements between
programs in order to mitigate the situation.
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"Both IPTL's6" would have had the most to loose without a commonality strategy as
there wasn't enough development resources available to do both projects independently. If there
wasn't any commonality the Development organization would have had to acquire additional
resources. Which, in the given business environment was highly unlikely" - CRM Core Team
Leader.
It also became evident that the commonality strategy wasn't just "a nice to have " for the
Development organization but rather a business necessity.
"It was an incredible amount of work just before we went ChR on it. It got worse as we
went along. As there were more A W spins it got to the point that it almost became un-
manageable. I became a single point for all the activity and it was very stressful. It was a
mental battle just to keep on top of the issues for each product."- 2nd CRM radio card
development prime
In summary, the traditional positions of decision making and influence within the
organization were altered. The business environment and the commonality strategy forced the
organization to collaborate, both formally, through the use of partnership agreements between
programs and informally, at the working level.
The Cultural Lens
The CRM program started as a single site, single group program shortly after the "tech
bubble burst" in 2001. Nortel Networks was going through down sizing; reductions in
65 IPTL - Integrated Product Team Leader, the formal name for core team leader.
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development spending and an overall business slow down. Employees within the development
organization were worried about losing their jobs. This led to a sense of needing to commit to
programs of high risk which provided high degrees of cost reduction. In retrospect, it is well
known that the positives of doing the project were emphasized, no negatives were mentioned and
the original schedules were embellished to suit the business needs.
"When we started on this program it was a "get on with it tough luck" attitude within
management as we were in the middle of layoffs. There was very little emphasis on stroking your
ego as they used to do before. It was a complete flip from only two months before." - CRM
Developer
Further evidence of a cultural shift occurred during the budgeting process for the CRM
program. The design estimates (DE's) were pushed from the top down rather than soliciting
input from the bottom up. No "buy in " was solicited from the individual designers which was a
significant departure from the previous norm.
There was a feeling that the organization was less collaborative during this period.
However, contradictory evidence also exists from external organizations indicating that the
Development organization was more collaborative than ever. This can partly be attributed to the
fact that resource constraints forced functional managers to work more closely to get their work
done. However, at the working level employees began to focus exclusively on their own
deliverables and this may have led to the observation that the environment was less collaborative.
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There is also an acknowledged culture of firefighting; activities are typically started
before a rigorous plan can be struck. The preferred project management style is to fix things on
the fly. The culture within the organization at the start of the program was significantly different
than it was toward the end of the program.
Tensions existed between the different stakeholder groups. For instance, PLM thought
the Development group was slow, not thorough and prone to make mistakes. The Development
team felt that PLM would ask for everything and deliver very poor requirements. Operations felt
that Development was always late on their EC's and they were often wrong or incomplete.
Development felt that Operations didn't provide adequate first level troubleshooting on issues.
However, based on those interviewed, they all felt that the culture always led to open and
frank communications between groups. Issues were typically addressed at the lowest levels of
management. In general, the culture on the team was described as collaborative.
"One thing that I thought was great was that people continued to work together even
though they had a disagreement." - CRMProduct Development Manager
For instance, two traditionally adversarial groups, Development and Test Engineering,
collaborated closely on CRM to the benefit of both parties and the program. Approximately half
way through the program, there were changes at the most senior levels of the Development
organization. The culture within the development team changed significantly as a result. The
new culture was once again much more inclusive.
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"The new management asked you how long it would take you to do something and then
hold you to your commitment. Ifelt more responsible as a stakeholder and therefore more
accountable for the outcome. " -CRMDeveloper
The culture changed from being highly risk prone and best efforts based66, to one in
which there was increased personal accountability, more control, heavy use of metrics and a
better balance between quality, cost and time to market. The other cultural differences between
the Calgary and Ottawa sites, previously described in this paper, also existed at the time but as
the two teams were working in relative autonomy, the interaction between the two sites has been
left out. Of significant note however, the functional management of the development
organization traditionally located in Calgary moved to Ottawa half way through the program at
the same time as the other major management changes took place.
Throughout all of the interviews, the sense of pride in the accomplishment of producing
the CRM and all its subsequent variants was consistent across all functions involved.
4.3.2 Design Structure Matrix
There were four simulations performed on the CRM module development. The first
DSM (DSM 4) reflects a CRM module for which four variants are developed simultaneously67
using the Nortel Networks TTM product development process. Unlike the previously discussed
CRM development of this paper, there are no unplanned iterations or resource constraints
66 This was commonly referred to as an "Entrepreneurial" culture by the employees and was viewed as positive.
67 See Appendix 2 for details of how this process was implemented into the DSM model.
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included in this analysis. However, the model does force commonality to occur at the following
DSM 4 task steps, Design Review-Task 19, Block Merge-Task 28, Alpha Design Complete-Task
47-50, Beta Design Complete-Task 71-74 and Product Development Complete Task 79. DSM 4
is shown in it's "as early as possible" (AEAP) analyzed form in Figure 32. The second DSM,
(DSM 1), reflects a hypothetical development program in which only a single CRM variant is
developed. DSM 1 is shown, for comparison, in it's "as early as possible" (AEAP) analyzed
form in Figure 33.
The DSMs are structured around the information flow outlined in the TTM development
process described in Section 1.3.4 of this paper. The TTM development process has three major
phases for hardware development commonly referred to as Prototype, Alpha and Beta. The
durations used in the simulation are based on estimates provided by the developers involved in
the original CRM project. The estimates provided were normalized in order to protect the
proprietary nature of this information. The "Detailed Design - Block 2" reflects the tight
coupling of activities during the detailed design phase between the two developers. The DSM
entries use the same nomenclature as those used for the Rx ASIC DSM given in Section 4.1.2.
There are three coupled blocks identified within each of the two DSMs. The first block
"Block 1 - Definition " corresponds with the requirements definition phase where there is
coupling between activities leading to the approval of the CRM for all four variants. The second
block "Block 2 - Detailed Design " represents the coupling of internal tasks associated
specifically with the development of the CRM prototypes at the functional block level. The tasks
for Block 2 converge on tasks Merge Blocks and Schematic Capture. The third and final block
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"Block 3 - Verification " reflects the close coupling of tasks associated with the five levels of
verification employed. Of particular note is the coupling at late stages of the verification process
back to the Update Schematic Task. This represents a "quick turn " loop in which "barnacles "68
may be added to an assembly manually rather than forcing the product back through its Beta
cycle again.
Although the CRM program was originally envisioned as executing as modeled in the
DSM, in reality six unplanned iterations occurred. As mentioned previously, commonality was
temporarily abandoned in order to expedite portions of the program. The implications of
abandoning the commonality strategy meant that although the 800MHz M2 CRM was the first to
market, it was also the last to be folded back into the common artwork strategy of the CRM.
68 "barnacle" - industry term used to represent manually applied modification.
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The results of the DSM analysis show a 23% difference in the mean lead time between
the simultaneous development of four CRM variants versus one CRM variant. A comparison for
each coupled block and complete estimated program duration is given in Table 8.
Table 8 - Simulated Product Development Lead Times for Multiple Variants of CRM
One CRM Variants
6 0 -i 600.8
08S50 
-0
8 40- 0.6 -
: 0
20 0.2 i
o 10 .
q 0 0
Lead Time
(without Resource Constraints)
Figure 34 - Simulated Development Lead Time One CRM Variant
69 Normalized lead time units
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Average Lead Times6 9
Block Name
Four Variants Three Variants Two Variants Single Variant
Block 1 - Definition 56.7 57 56.3 52.8
Block 2 - Detailed Design 61.4 63.1 62.9 62.7
Block 3 - Verification 72.5 70.2 66.2 59.2
i = 188 t = 178.2 I= 167.3 p = 153 .9
Total Program Duration s = 14.5 s = 15.5 s = 17.9 s = 20.8
and (10, 30, 50, 70, (10, 30, 50, 70, (10, 30, 50, 70, (10, 30, 50, 70,
Confidence Intervals 90) % 90) % 90) % 90) %
= (173, 183, 190, = (156, 175, 180, = (141, 161, 171, = (129, 140,
195,203) 186,194) 178,186) 151,169,180)
Figure 35 - Development Lead Time Two CRM Variants
Figure 36 - Development Lead Time Three CRM Variants
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Figure 37 - Development Lead Time Four CRM Variants
4.4 Base Transceiver System (BTS)
The compact BTS (cBTS) is a CDMA 3G base-station capable of supporting a 3 carrier,
3 sector deployment70 in a single shelf. The base-station contains all the required functionality to
process wireless voice and data communications to and from a mobile user. A description of the
functionality of each major functional block within the cBTS is provided in Table 9. A high
level functional block diagram of a typical Nortel Networks CDMA BTS is provided in Figure
38 for reference. The system is a mechanical assembly which utilizes a modular bus architecture,
the physical realization of the system is shown in Figure 39. The cBTS is the top level assembly
located at level 0 of the product hierarchy shown in Figure 12.
70 One CDMA carrier is capable of supporting up to 22 voice calls, sectors refers to antenna orientation.
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Table 9 - Description of cBTS Functional Blocks
Confrable 3 Sector Antenna
Breaker Alarm Module TI Interface
Module |Module
Fan A nr
GPS
.DC_ Poer-- Timing -1
Module
Channel I--------- ---------------------
Channel HSSL Control HSSL Duplexor
Chamnte Module Radio
o~u~le Fan Alarm Module RxMi/Di
Fan Tray
cBTS Functional Block Diagram
Figure 38 - CDMA cBTS High Level Functional Block Diagram
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Major Module Function Common
TI Interface Module Provides protection for the Ti/El transport network interfaces.
(TIIM) Yes
Customer Configurable Supports multiple customer configurable alarms, a shared GPSTM,
Alarm Module (CCAM) fan tray alarm monitoring and input DC voltage monitoring. No
GPSystem Timing Module The GPSTM interfaces with the GPS antenna and provides the main
(GPSTM) timing signal to the rest of the system. Yes
Provides system control and packet switching and routing, also
Control Module (CM) interfaces with CORE module on legacy systems. Yes
Channel Element Module Performs all of the vocoding, spreading and de spreading associated
(CEM) with CDMA signal processing. Yes
Radio Module Tx and Rx RF signal conditioning including amplification, frequency
(FRM, MFRM, CRM) conversion, attenuation, filtering and output power monitoring. Yes
Figure 39 - cBTS Physical Realization
The cBTS platform was conceived of a simple, cost effective entry level BTS specifically
targeting markets in developing countries. The development program focused primarily on
reducing product cost through the elimination of non-integrated OEM assemblies, removal of
non essential functionality, increased functional integration through the use of a more integrated
bus modular architecture 7 1. As with the CRM, it was felt that by integrating functionality,
reducing material handling and manufacturing effort a cost benefit could be achieved. Expected
ancillary benefits were: improved reliability, performance and a reduction in return rates. The
PLM organization placed one significant commonality constraint on the program; all high value
digital modules had to be common with the existing Metrocell72 platform. This was to protect
71 Ulrich, Karl T. and Eppinger, Steven D., 2000, "Product Design and Development", 2nd Ed., McGraw-Hill Co.,
Boston, ISBN 0-07-229647, p 18 5
72 Metrocell is a Nortel Networks trademark and refers to its main line of CDMA BTS.
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existing customers from carrying extra spares inventory and to minimize the design effort,
especially with respect to software on the new cBTS platform.
The technical prime made proposals based on the constraints placed on the design team
by the PLM organization to keep the digital modules the same, effectively forcing commonality
to the Metrocell platform. This commonality requirement at the highest level of assembly
ultimately drove churn into existing development programs such as the CM2 and CRM program
previously discussed.
4.4.1 The Three Lenses
The Strategic Lens
As a new platform introduction, the cBTS required significant architectural definition.
This work began well in advance of the formal development program. The PLM organization,
Development organization and Marketing were the key stakeholders in the early part of the
program where the commonality strategy was first established.
"Because of the strategy chosen, there was a lot of work that occurred before SR. This
was the biggest chunk of work with the System Design Specification and the High Level Design
documents. After SR had been achieved on the project the work load dropped off significantly"
- cBTS Architect.
Once high level agreement had been reached, the architecture and commonality strategy
between cBTS and Metrocell was communicated to the broader team. The digital modules were
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to be common with the Metrocell in order to ease the business transition onto the new cBTS
platform. The new RF module commonality was assured by having the CRM development team
develop a radio for both Metrocell and cBTS. Software commonality was assured through
hardware commonality and the desire to maintain one software stream for the cBTS.
"The fact that we had common software was absolutely critical to the R&D saving
achieved" - cBTS Architect.
As the cBTS is a customer orderable system, it must be introduced using the TTM
process given in Section 1.3.4. There was only one TTM team developing the cBTS and all its
core members were co-located in one site. As there were many dependencies between
subordinate programs "partnership agreements " were used to co-ordinate deliverables. Notably,
the "partnership agreement" between the CRM program and the cBTS program proved
particularly challenging.
Within the CRM TTM core team, there were four functional stakeholders, representing
Development, Operations, Service Introduction and Product Line Management. The role of the
New Product Program Manager and the Core Team Leader was to ensure that the program
delivered against its commitments to the business. The cBTS development team was formed
around the Nortel Networks TTM model shown in Figure 5.
Linking of subordinate activities occurred as high level specifications and detailed design
documents became ratified by the broader organization. Lower level activities became aligned
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and synchronized with the high level system development effort. The grouping of activities and
the program structure is given in Figure 38. The figure indicates a high degree of reciprocal
interdependency between activities not unexpected at this level of assembly. Due to the layering
of TTM programs, the complexity and interaction between individuals at the working level were
not directly visible. The majority of work for the cBTS core team leader involved juggling the
higher level schedule.
OCDMA H/WDevelopment
Group 2
Supply Chain Product
go Operations Development
Prime 3 Manager 3
eDCG TTM
Core Team
CEM Produc
Development
Manager 4
Partnership_
CRM TTM -cBTS TTM
Core Team Core Team
Supply Chain Product Product Supply Chain
Operations Development --------- Development Operations
Prime I Manager I Manager 2 Prime 2
CDM H/WDevelopment
Group I
S Test Engineering
Figure 40 - cBTS Program Structure Showing Reciprocal Task Interdependence 7
7James Thompson, 1967, introduced a topology of task interdependence - reciprocal, sequential and pooled
119 of 143
"No major problems were encountered Multiple groups were involved which is
inevitable on any project regardless of commonality. The XCEM192 which was designed by the
Ottawa group was partitioned as a complete unit (black box). The amount of re-use on cBTS
actually made it easier to work between sites." - cBTS Architect
At this level of assembly, there appeared to be excellent alignment to the high level
business metrics TTM, TTC and TTQ. The commonality strategy chosen helped to focus and
align activities to the top level metrics. Ultimately, more commonality was achieved than had
originally been planned. The commonality strategy remained in place for the complete duration
of the program indicating that good grouping, linking and alignment of activities had been
achieved.
The Political Lens
The PLM organization and the Development organization were the two primary
stakeholders. The majority of decision making and direction setting for the program occurred
prior to the SR business decision point, effectively limiting the dialogue to these two groups.
Cost and Time to Market conflicted most with the commonality strategy. Higher degrees
of commonality in the digital group would have extended the project and consequently cost more
money. Quality was already benchmarked against the existing product.
The Development organization wanted lower development costs and the PLM group
wanted more commonality to assist in market acceptance. Once agreement was reached, the
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Development Organization performed an analysis whose sole purpose was to optimize
Development benefits first. This included minimizing variance between legacy products,
schedule risk and the ability to be able to verify, at system level, very early on in the project.
The Development organization also optimized their resource profiles and reviewed the long term
technical benefits of the program. Once this work had been completed, the plan was sent out for
review to the broader group of stakeholders such as PLM, Operations, Marketing and the Product
Cost group.
"I was the judge andjury. I stated my opinion first and then challenges could be made
after the fact." - CDMA Hardware Development Director.
In summary, the high level direction for the cBTS program was agreed to between the
two major stakeholders. Primary considerations were customer acceptance, product cost and
product quality. Being able to quantify these against the existing BTS platform helped both
stakeholders agree on a commonality strategy which would benefit both organizations and
ultimately the customer. As the degree of commonality was quite high, input from other
stakeholders was viewed as less crucial.
The Cultural Lens
The cBTS program was generally viewed as portion of the natural and necessary
evolution of the existing Metrocell BTS portfolio. As such, there was much debate in regards to
the systems ultimate form. During the initial product definition meetings, the pervasive culture
was one of consensus building.
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"Indecisiveness during project launch and concept stages up to MR we tried to "boil the
ocean ". We are afraid to make a decision and then review it later for mistakes or adjustments.
There is an apparent lack of trust early on in a project based on biased opinions not objectives."
- CDMA Hardware Development Director
The frustration with the consensus building was primarily found at the management level.
Outside of the management organization, the culture was seen as entrepreneurial and fast paced,
similar to that of a start up.
"It felt like a more agile environment as we only had one decision maker and we did not
rely on committees to make decisions. We also had a smaller team in place. "- cBTS Architect.
A parallel observation was made on the CRM program. The organization has a culture of
consensus based decision making. Although it appears to be slow to those involved, once a
decision is reached, there is 100% alignment by all stakeholders in doing whatever it takes to get
the job done.
As with the other programs studied, subtle subcultures existed within each functional
group involved. One observation cited the differences between the hardware development team
and the software development team. The software team was viewed as being more conservative
whereas the hardware development team was viewed as being prone to take risks. Another
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observation cited the differences between the PLM and Development groups as one in which
each of the parties often felt that role reversals took place.
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5 RESULTS
5.1 The Three Lenses
The results indicate a strong correlation between commonality and the triple constraints
of TTM, TTQ and TTC. The data gathered through multiple interviews for this thesis, indicates
that an imbalance between TTM, TTQ and TTC metrics drives away from achieving
commonality. The most significant driver was found to be TTM. This was the case in the early
stages of the CRM program and the later stages of the DTRx program. On the cBTS program,
the scope of the development activity was limited to re using existing modules. This
commonality constraint was primarily driven by the need to meet TTM through re use. The
second most significant driver was found to be TTC. In several instances, when there would
have been additional costs added to the product due to commonality, the requirement was
quickly abandoned. This was observed on all four projects studied. Interestingly, the Rx ASIC,
which technically, has no cost associated with extra functionality, has extra unused functionality
built in. The least significant driver was found to be TTQ. This is partly attributable to the
ingrained Nortel Networks quality culture in which high quality is considered a given.
The implications of TTM, TTC and TTQ also became evident in situations in which there
was poor alignment of project objectives. In all of the projects analyzed, poor alignment with all
of TTM, TTC and TTQ resulted in less commonality.
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The three lens's analysis also showed that organizational structure, although important
for the purpose of alignment to objectives, was not as important as a structure to arbitrate conflict.
This was specifically seen on the Rx ASIC and the DTRx card.
The results of the three lens's analysis are shown graphically in Figure 41, a description
of the axis is provided in Table 10.
Alignment
5
Benefit Linking
g- ASIC
" DTRx
CRM
" ' cBTS
Equity Grouping
Figure 41 - Three Lens's Analysis Summary Plot
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Axis Name Description Scale Interpretation
Alignment Degree of alignment between the commonality Scale 0 Poor Alignment ... 5 Excellent
strategy and the business objectives of the other Alignment
stakeholders.
Linking Degree of linkage between the commonality Scale: no linkage 0.....5 tight linkage
strategy chosen and the top level metrics of the (commonality was a top level metric)
product namely quality, cost and time to
market.
Grouping Impact due to organizational structure resulting Scale: low to no impact to work due to
from the implementation of the chosen organizational structure 0.....5 high
commonality strategy. (multiple groups, impact to work due to organizational
multiple sites, different languages, time zones) structure.
Equity Degree of equity between stakeholders during Scale: no consideration of equity
development phase with respect to impacts 0.....5 high consideration for equity
arising from the commonality strategy chosen. between stakeholders.
Benefit Degree of benefit derived from the Scale: detrimental 0, 3 neutral, 5
commonality strategy chosen. beneficial.
Table 10 - Three Lens's Plot Axis Description
5.2 Design Structure Matrix
The DSM analysis indicated that there was far less impact to product development lead
time than originally thought. Between different levels of assembly, there appears to be less
impact at the higher levels of assembly as can be seen in Figure 42.
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Figure 42 - Impact of Commonality vs. Level of Assembly
The increase in product development lead time, with respect to the number of parallel
variants being designed, is given in Figure 43. There appears to be a marginal increase in
development time as more variants are added.
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Figure 43- Product Development Lead Time vs. Number of Variants
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At higher levels assembly, the use of common parts becomes inevitable.
"To make an apple piefrom scratch, you wouldfirst have to invent the universe."- Carl
Seagan
TTM has been shown to be detrimental to achieving higher degrees of commonality. The
drive to reduce product development lead time is not new. Understanding what the optimum
TTM interval is applicable to the market being addressed is crucial. This can be done using the
two methodologies previously mentioned. The first involves determining the clock speed 4 of
the industry as outlined by Fine (1998), this sets the interval or industry "tact time ". The second
involves determining where the product is in its life cycle. This can be done using the dominant
design framework7 5 proposed by Utterback (1996). Given these two data points one can
determine the maximum appropriate development time available. This provides a planning
horizon around which development activities can be scoped and commonality strategies defined.
TTC is crucial to the profitability of business. Carrying the cost of unnecessary
functionality within a product is detrimental. When selecting a commonality strategy, it should
be applied to the highest level of assembly which does not impact product cost. Tradeoffs
between sustaining costs, carrying costs and manufacturing cost also need to be considered in
determining the correct level of assembly address. For the cases studied in this paper, the ASIC
74 Fine, Charles, 1998, "Clock Speed", Purseus Books, Reading, Massachusetts, ISBN 0-7382-0001-8, pp 3-15
7 Utterback, James, 1996, "Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation", Harvard Business School Press, Boston,
Massachusetts, ISBN 0-87584-740-4
128 of 143
is a good example of a part which should be common. The DTRx is a good example of a part
that should not be common with respect to its implications on TTC.
One must also consider the degree of commonality to pursue. A perfectly common part
is a commodity. A part shared between businesses may or may not be beneficial to all those
involved. Understanding the benefits to each user is crucial in sustaining a commonality strategy.
The three lens's7 6 framework provides organizational insight into these types of issues. Within
the Wireless BTS market for instance, Nokia has chosen to commoditize the BTS through it's
sponsorship of the Open Base Station Architecture Initiative (OBSAI). L.M. Ericsson, has
chosen to have a common BTS platform for both CDMA and UMTS. Finally, Nortel Networks
has chosen to pursue a hybrid strategy for its BTS portfolio.
The structure of a development team has proven to be crucial in delivering commonality.
Having two teams working autonomously on similar products will ultimately lead to two distinct
products.
Finally, the choice of technology is crucial. Getting locked into a particular architecture,
due to an underlying technology, can, be detrimental as seen in the work of Henderson77 and
Clark (1990).
76 Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen and Westney, 1999, "Organizational Behavior & Processes",
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, South-Western College Publishing, Boston MA, ISBN 0-538-87546-1
77 Henderson, Rebecca and Kim Clark, 1990, "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly, 35 (1990): p 24
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This paper studied the impacts of commonality on product development lead time using
two methodologies. More work is required, however, in the area of grouping, linking and
aligning of activities within a development project team around achieving the desired degree of
commonality. Within the projects studied in this paper, commonality was championed by a
single individual. The effort to align multiple disparate organizations around one commonality
strategy is viewed as a barrier to the decision making process.
The DSM analysis performed in this paper is relatively simple, utilizing the higher level
couplings inherent in the Nortel Networks organization and within its product development
processes. Further detailed analysis, taking into account, resource constraints, individual
communications between parties and unexpected iterations, would add further insight. This
could ultimately provide a tool to assess the impact of a chosen commonality strategy within its
current constraints.
Finally, a system dynamics view of commonality would be a useful addition to this work,
in particular, with respect to understanding the difficulty in rationalizing the apparent conflict
between commonality and TTM.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Task Names/Dependencies used in DTRx DSM.
Task
ID Task Name Predecessors
I Project Plan Approval & Funding
2 CDMA External Interfaces Defined 1
3 UMTS External Interfaces Defined 1
4 DTRx Internal Interfaces Defined 1
5 BlockI: Definition 2,3,4
6 Detailed Design Specification (DS) Approved
7 Design Review CDMA 6FS
8 Design Review UMTS 6FS
9 (D) Blocki Duration
10 JTAG Circuit schematic capture 5
11 HSSPC2 and High Speed Serial Link schemtic capture 5
12 Block2: Detailed Design 10, 11
13 Power supplies schematic capture
14 Processor and Memory schematic capture 13FS
15 Reset Circuit schematic caputure 14FS
16 PA Control Interface schematic capture 14FS
17 Clock Circuit schematic capture 14FS, 15FS
18 Tx Channelizers schematic capture 14FS
19 Rx Channelizers schematic capture 14FS
20 (D) Block2 Duration
21 Schematic Generation 12
22 Internal Design Review (DI) 21
23 Update Schematic 1 22
24 UMTS Stock List Generated 23
25 CDMA Stock List Generated 24
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26 Specific Featured defined 25
27 Common Features defined 26
28 Block3: Verification 27
29 Functional Agreement Review (FA)
30 Update Schematic 1 29
31 UMTS Stock List Update 1 30
32 CDMA Stock List Update 1 31
33 Specific Features Updated 1 31FS, 32FS
34 Common Features Updated 1 33
35 DFx Report Generated 30FS, 31FS, 32FS, 34FS
36 PCP Layout Generated 31FS, 32FS, 35
37 Component Placement Agreement (CPA) 33FS, 34FS, 36
38 PCP Layout Updated 1 37
39 Specific Features Updated 2 38FS
40 Common Features Updated 2 38FS, 39FS
41 Physical Agreement (PA) 29, 35, 39, 40
42 PCP Layout Updated 2 41
43 Build EC 42
44 Designer Verification Testing CDMA (DVT) 43
45 Designer Verification Testing UMTS (DVT) 43
46 WRD-024 R&D MIT (Module Integrated) UMTS 43, 45FS
47 WRD-024 R&D DIT (Design Integrated) UMTS 43, 45FS, 46FS
48 WRD-024 R&D NIT (Node Integrated) UMTS 43, 45FS, 46FS, 47FS
49 WRD-024 R&D SIT (System Integrated) UMTS 43, 45FS, 46FS, 47FS, 48FS
50 WRD-024 R&D MIT (Module Integration) CDMA 43, 44FS
51 WRD-024 R&D DIT (Design Integrated) CDMA 43, 44FS, 50FS
52 WRD-024 R&D NIT (Node Integrated) CDMA 43, 44FS, 50FS, 51FS
53 WRD-024 R&D SIT (System Integrated) CDMA 43, 44FS, 50FS, 51FS, 52FS
54 (D) Block3 Duration
55 WRD-024 R&D PDC (Product Development Complete) UMTS 28
56 WRD-024 R&D PDC (Product Development Complete) CDMA 28
57 DTRx Design Close 55,56
58 WRD-024 R&D CuR (Customer Ready) UMTS 55
59 WRD-024 R&D CuR (Customer Ready) CDMA 56
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60 WRD-024 R&D ChR (Channel Ready) UMTS 58
61 WRD-024 R&D ChR (Channel Ready) CDMA 59
Table 11 - Coupled DTRx Development CDMA/UMTS
Task
ID Task Name Predecessors
I Project Plan Approval & Funding
2 CDMA External Interfaces Defined 1
3 DTRx Internal Interfaces Defined I
4 Blockl: Definition 2,3
5 Detailed Design Specification (DS) Approved
6 Design Review CDMA 5FS
7 (D) Blocki Duration
8 JTAG Circuit schematic capture 4
9 HSSPC2 and High Speed Serial Link schemtic capture 4
10 Block2: Detailed Design 8, 9
11 Power supplies schematic capture
12 Processor and Memory schematic capture 1 FS
13 Reset Circuit schematic caputure 12FS
14 PA Control Interface schematic capture 12FS
15 Clock Circuit schematic capture 12FS, 13FS
16 Tx Channelizers schematic capture 12FS
17 Rx Channelizers schematic capture 12FS
18 (D) Block2 Duration
19 Schematic Generation 10
20 Internal Design Review (DI) 19
21 Update Schematic 1 20
22 CDMA Stock List Generated 21
23 Specific Featured defined 22
24 Common Features defined 23
25 Block3: Verification 24
26 Functional Agreement Review (FA)
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27 Update Schematic 1 26
28 CDMA Stock List Update 1 27
29 Specific Features Updated 1 28FS
30 Common Features Updated 1 29
31 DFx Report Generated 27FS, 28FS, 30FS
32 PCP Layout Generated 28FS, 29FS, 31
33 Component Placement Agreement (CPA) 29FS, 30FS, 32
34 PCP Layout Updated 1 33
35 Specific Features Updated 2 34FS
36 Common Features Updated 2 34FS, 35FS
37 Physical Agreement (PA) 26, 31, 35, 36
38 PCP Layout Updated 2 37
39 Build EC 38
40 Designer Verification Testing CDMA (DVT) 39
41 WRD-024 R&D MIT (Module Integration) CDMA 39, 40FS
42 WRD-024 R&D DIT (Design Integrated) CDMA 39, 40FS, 41FS
43 WRD-024 R&D NIT (Node Integrated) CDMA 39, 40FS, 41FS, 42FS
44 WRD-024 R&D SIT (System Integrated) CDMA 39, 40FS, 41FS, 42FS, 43FS
45 (D) Block3 Duration
46 DTRx Design Close 25
47 WRD-024 R&D PDC (Product Development Complete) CDMA 25
48 WRD-024 R&D CuR (Customer Ready) CDMA 47
49 WRD-024 R&D ChR (Channel Ready) CDMA 48
Table 12 - Hypothetical DTRx Development CDMA Variant
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Appendix 2 - Task Names/Dependencies used in CRM DSM.
Task
ID Task Name Predecessors
I Project Plan Approval & Funding
2 CRMI 800 MHz M2Variant Defined 1
3 CRM2 1900 MHz M2 Variant Defined 1
4 CRM3 800 MHz RM Variant Defined 1
5 CRM4 1900 MHz RM Variant Defined 1
6 BlockI: Definition 2,3,4,5
7 Synthesize Specifications
8 Partition Direct Requirements 7FS
9 Partition Indirect Requirements 8FS
10 Define External Interfaces 9FS
11 Define Internal Interfaces lOFS
12 CRM 1 Design Specification (DS) Approved 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
13 CRM 2 Design Specification (DS) Approved 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
14 CRM 3 Design Specification (DS) Approved 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
15 CRM 4 Design Specification (DS) Approved 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
16 CRM I Test Plan Approved 12FS
17 CRM 2 Test Plan Approved 13FS
18 CRM 3 Test Plan Approved 14FS
19 CRM 4 Test Plan Approved 15FS
20 Design Review CDMA 12, 13, 14,15,16,17,18,19
21 (D) Blockl Duration
22 Block2: Prototope Verification 6
23 Synthesize Digital Block & Pre D Specification
24 Synthesize Rx Block Specification 23
25 Synthesize Tx Block Specification 24
26 Synthesize LO Block Specification 25
27 (D) Block2 Duration
28 DVT Digital Block & Pre D 6
29 DVT Rx Block 6
30 DVT Tx Block 6
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31 DVT LO Block 6
32 Block Merge 28, 29, 30, 31
33 Digital Block & Pre D Design 22, 32
34 Rx Block Design 22, 32
35 Tx Block Design 22, 32
36 LO Block Design 22, 32
37 Interface Validation 32
38 Schematic Generation 37
39 Internal Design Review (DI) 38
40 Functional Agreement Review (FA) 39
41 Component Placement Agreement (CPA) 40
42 Physical Agreement (PA) 41
43 Alpha Build EC CRM 1 42
44 Alpha Build EC CRM 2 42
45 Alpha Build EC CRM 3 42
46 Alpha Build EC CRM 4 42
47 Design Test (DT) CRM 1 43
48 Design Test (DT) CRM 2 44
49 Design Test (DT) CRM 3 45
50 Design Test (DT) CRM 4 46
51 CRM 1 Alpha Design Close 47, 48, 49, 50
52 CRM 2 Alpha Design Close 47, 48, 49, 50
53 CRM 3 Alpha Design Close 47, 48, 49, 50
54 CRM 4 Alpha Design Close 47, 48, 49, 50
55 WRD-024 MIT CRM 1 51
56 WRD-024 MIT CRM 2 52
57 WRD-024 MIT CRM 3 53
58 WRD-024 MIT CRM 4 54
59 Block3: Beta Phase Verification 55, 56, 57, 58
60 Update Schematic
61 Functional Agreement Review (FA) 60
62 Component Placement Agreement (CPA) 61
63 Physical Agreement (PA) 62
64 Beta Build EC CRM 1 63
65 Beta Build EC CRM 2 63
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66 Beta Build EC CRM 3 63
67 Beta Build EC CRM 4 63
68 Design Test (DT) CRM 1 64
69 Design Test (DT) CRM 2 65
70 Design Test (DT) CRM 3 66
71 Design Test (DT) CRM 4 67
72 Verification Report CRM I 68FS
73 Verification Report CRM 2 69FS
74 Verification Report CRM 3 70FS
75 Verification Report CRM 4 71FS
76 CRM 1 Beta Design Close 72, 73FS, 74FS, 75FS
77 CRM 2 Beta Design Close 72FS, 73, 74FS, 75FS
78 CRM 3 Beta Design Close 72FS, 73FS, 74, 75FS
79 CRM 4 Beta Design Close 72FS, 73FS, 74FS, 75
80 WRD-024 MIT CRM I 76FS
81 WRD-024 MIT CRM 2 77FS
82 WRD-024 MIT CRM 3 78FS
83 WRD-024 MIT CRM 4 79FS
84 (D) Block3 Duration
85 WRD-024 R&D PDC (Prd Development Complete) 59
Table 13 - CRM Four Variant DSM Coupling (Forced Commonality)
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Appendix 3 - Chronology of Nortel Networks Corporate History 8
Early Years
1882 - Formed telephone set mfg. department of The Bell Telephone Company of Canada.
1885 - Northern Electric and Manufacturing division established
1895 - Northern Electric and Manufacturing incorporated as separate company
1913 - Northern Elec. and Western Elec. agree to reciprocal purchases and patent exchanges
1956 - U.S. government action leads to sale of AT&T shares in Northern Elec. severing access
to Western Elec. patents and designs
Growth and Independence
1957 - Northern Elec. establishes R&D lab with a staff of four.
1962 - Northern Elec. becomes wholly owned subsidiary of Bell Telephone Company of
1970 - Bell-Northern Research Ltd., jointly owned by Bell Canada and Northern Elec.
1971 - Northern Elec. sets up a U.S. subsidiary - Northern Telecom Inc. - to manufacture and
sell telecommunications equipment in the United States Industry Leader and Innovator
1976 - Northern Electric becomes Northern Telecom (NT) and introduces "Digital World"
portfolio, the world's first complete line of fully digital telecommunications equipment
1984 - AT&T divests what become Regional Bell Operating Companies, opening the
U.S. market to NT digital products that maintain a significant technological lead over the
competition throughout the 1980s
1989 - NT introduces "Fiber World" initiative for systems based on fiber optic technology.
A Global Corporation
1990s - NT expands internationally, establishing alliances in Asia and Europe, and signing key
contracts in Japan, China, and the United Kingdom
1992 - NT acquires Novatel Wireless and Matra Communications
1995 - NT introduces "Nortel" brand and celebrates its centenary
The Internet and New Challenges for the 21st Century
1997 - NT articulates vision of building a new Internet with the speed, capacity, reliability and
security needed to underpin global communications and business
1998 - NT introduces "Nortel Networks" brand, reflecting a new focus on packet and IP-
optimized network solutions.
1999 - NT name change to Nortel Networks (NN)
2000 - NN becomes fully independent when BCE Inc. reduces its holdings
2004 - NN simplifies brand to "Nortel", reflecting a new focus on simplicity, clarity and vision.
NE- Northern Electric, WE- Western Electric, NT- Northern Telecom, NN- Nortel Networks.
7 Source: Nortel Networks corporate web site http://www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/corptime/index.html
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Appendix 4 - Effect of Commonality on Product Development Lead Time Survey
This survey is part of a paper being written on the effect of commonality on product
development lead times. The objective of the paper is to establish the relationship between the
use of common parts and length of time it takes to develop or change a product during the
various stages of its lifecycle. Participation is completely voluntary; the information gathered
will not be used for any purpose other than to support the work of this paper. No personal
information will be gathered or used as part of the research.
Task Execution
The following series of questions pertain to assessing your role and your department's role in
setting and executing on the commonality strategy for the product in question.
1. For this study, a common part is defined as a part that is used on higher level assemblies
across multiple platforms or technologies. Using this definition what is the role of your
functional organization in setting the commonality strategy for the product in question?
Scale: no role 0.....5 a significant role
2. To the best of your knowledge what other stakeholders were involved in setting the
commonality strategy for the product in question?
3. What were the roles of the other stakeholders in establishing the commonality strategy - why
were they involved?
4. Once the commonality strategy had been established how was the work structured/organized
in order to maintain commonality?
Scale: ad hoc 0.....5 very structured around commonality goals
5. How was commonality linked to the top level metrics of the product namely quality, cost and
time to market?
Scale: no linkage 0.....5 tight linkage (commonality was a top level metric)
6. Which Life Cycle Management phases were more work, which were less work for you with
respect to a no commonality strategy having been chosen?
Scale: less work 0, same amount of work 3 and more work 5
7. Specifically with respect to organizational structure how was your work impacted by the
commonality strategy chosen? For instance, were multiple sites involved? Were other groups
with the same functional mandate involved? Was it necessary to communicate across multiple
time zones? Did the number of meetings increase? Was language an issue?
Scale: low to no impact to work due to organizational structure 0.....5 high impact to work due
to organizational structure.
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Decision Making
The following series of questions pertain to how the commonality of the product in question fits
in with the short and long term business objectives of the organizations in which it was or could
have been deployed.
1. Within your role are you accountable for meeting the business objectives of any particular
line of business? Did these objectives influence your decision on the degree of commonality to
pursue with respect to the product in question?
Scale: low degree of influence 0.....5 high degree of influence
2. To the best of your knowledge, how well did the commonality strategy chosen align with the
specific business objectives of the other stakeholders?
Scale: poor alignment 0.....5 excellent alignment
3. What, if any, constraints were placed on the commonality strategy by the stakeholders in order
to ensure that their own interests were not compromised?
Scale: no constraints 0.....5 a great number of constraints
4. Once the commonality strategy had been established, how were tradeoffs performed in order
to ensure equity between all shareholders?
Scale: no consideration of equity 0.....5 high consideration for equity between stakeholders.
5. Which of the following top level product metrics namely quality, cost and time to market
conflicted most with the commonality strategy chosen? Between which stakeholders did the
biggest differences in interests/objectives exist? Who had the most to loose by not meeting their
objectives?
6. Did the commonality strategy originally set change at any time during the Life Cycle
Management process? If so, at what phase did it change, what stakeholders where involved and
what rationale was given?
Scale: no change 0.....5 complete abandonment
7. Did you feel that the interest of your functional department, business or Nortel Networks as a
whole was best served by the commonality strategy chosen? Please describe any compromises
that you felt were made on behalf of your function or those you represent.
Scale: contradicts departmental interests 0, 3 neutral, 5 furthered interests of department
8. Did a transfer of design control/authority occur from one group to another because of the
commonality strategy chosen?
Scale: no transfer of design control 0, shared control 3, full transfer of design control 5
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Culture
In every organization there is a unique culture. For instance the culture in Nortel Networks prior
to the right angle turn in 1997 was quite different than the culture today. The following series of
questions pertain to how the culture within Nortel Networks impacted the commonality strategy
of the part in question.
1. Briefly describe Nortel Networks culture and some of its main attributes during the
development of the part in question?
2. Of each of the stakeholders involved are there any sub cultures which exists between groups,
sites, lines of business or functions. If so, please describe them.
3. Briefly which attributes of Nortel Networks culture do you believe enhance a commonality
strategy and which do you believe deter from it.
4. Do you believe that a higher degree of commonality between platforms in the Wireless
business would be of benefit to Nortel Networks? Why/Why Not?
Scale: no benefit 0......5 very beneficial
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